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Cloud computing infrastructures serving mutually untrusted users provide se-
curity isolation to protect user computation and resources. Additionally, clouds
should also support flexibility and efficiency, so that users can customize re-
source management policies and optimize performance and resource utiliza-
tion. However, flexibility and efficiency are typically limited due to security
requirements. This dissertation investigates the question of how to offer flexi-
bility and efficiency as well as strong security in cloud infrastructures.
Specifically, this dissertation addresses two important platforms in cloud in-
frastructures: the containers and the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) platforms.
The containers platform supports efficient container provisioning and execut-
ing, but does not provide sufficient security and flexibility. Different containers
share an operating system kernel which has a large attack surface, and kernel
customization is generally not allowed. The IaaS platform supports secure shar-
ing of cloud resources among mutually untrusted users, but does not provide
sufficient flexibility and efficiency. Many powerful management primitives en-
abled by the underlying virtualization platform are hidden from users, such as
live virtual machine migration and consolidation.
The main contribution of this dissertation is the proposal of an approach in-
spired by the exokernel architecture that can be generalized to any multi-tenant
system to improve security, flexibility, and efficiency. This approach is called
the exokernel approach — a principle of separating protection and management.
By separating protection and management, the protection layer can focus on
security isolation and resource multiplexing, making security guarantees eas-
ier to maintain and verify. Resource management components are dedicated to
each user or application for customization and optimization, greatly improving
flexibility and efficiency. We investigate the effectiveness of this approach by ap-
plying it to the containers and the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) platforms,
and introduce X-Containers and Library Cloud. X-Containers is a new exoker-
nel+LibOS architecture that is fully compatible with Linux containers and pro-
vides competitive or superior performance to native Docker Containers as well
as other LibOS designs. Library Cloud is a new abstraction that enables more
flexible and efficient user-level cloud resource management without breaking
security isolation between different users. Together, these systems represent
important steps towards secure, flexible, and efficient cloud infrastructures.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources, (e.g., net-
works, servers, storage, applications, and services,) that can be rapidly provi-
sioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider inter-
action [93]. The data center hardware and software that supports cloud com-
puting is what we call a cloud. We are experiencing an historic shift as more and
more computer memory, processing power and applications are moved into
the cloud, and organizations become less and less dependent on locally man-
ufactured Information Technology (IT) infrastructures. This allows the long-
held dream of computing as a utility to come true, which makes software even
more attractive as a service and shapes the way IT hardware is designed and
purchased [30]. The major benefits of cloud computing include fast resource
provisioning, low maintenance cost, and scalability. It is a new paradigm of
organization and distribution of computation, storage, and network resources.
Clouds serve multiple users, and mutually untrusted users share cloud re-
sources relying on the cloud platform for security isolation — the protection of
user computation and resources against unauthorized access, data leakage, and
malicious attacks or damages. Additionally, cloud platforms should also pro-
vide flexibility and efficiency. Flexibility refers to the support of user customiza-
tion on cloud services and resource management policies. Efficiency refers to
the capability of the cloud to improve performance and reduce cost of resources
such as hardware, energy, man power, money, and time. Achieving security,
flexibility, and efficiency is one of the fundamental requirements in cloud in-
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frastructures.
Guaranteeing security isolation without sacrificing flexibility and efficiency
is challenging. In many systems, security isolation is typically achieved by lim-
iting user customization, which hurts flexibility. Crossing security isolation
boundaries generally incurs performance overhead, affecting efficiency. Fur-
ther, more flexibility implies exposing more control to users, which can lead
to weaker security isolation. As an example, operating systems (OSs) such
as Linux [43] expose high-level abstractions, such as virtual memory and file
systems, and restrict direct access to hardware resources. Virtual memory im-
proves security isolation of different processes, but imposes limitations on ap-
plications when they need optimized memory management. Accessing the OS
kernel across the kernel isolation boundary is much more expensive than ac-
cessing user-level libraries. To support customization and reduce access over-
head, Linux allows loading a kernel module and executing user-defined func-
tions within the kernel. However, this breaks most security isolation boundaries
enforced by the kernel, and can cause many vulnerabilities. Similarly, contain-
ers [110], which refer to user-space instances virtualized by the OS kernel that
have separate views on the operating system, support efficient provisioning and
execution, but cannot provide sufficient security and flexibility due to the share
of underlying OS kernel. The Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [93] cloud, a
cloud service model that supports users to deploy and run arbitrary software
and provides limited control of networking and storage components, exposes
high-level abstractions, and poses limitations on how cloud resources can be
utilized. As a result, cloud users cannot perform as many operations as they
can in a private data center.
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This dissertation addresses the following research question: how to offer flex-
ibility and efficiency as well as strong security in cloud infrastructures? In particular,
we address two important platforms in cloud infrastructures: the containers
platform and the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) platform. We investigate ap-
plying the exokernel approach [57] — a principle of separating protection and
management in the design of computation systems. By separating protection
and management, containers can be optimized to provide strong security iso-
lation and kernel customization while still supporting efficient execution, and
IaaS platforms can enable more flexible and efficient resource management op-
erations without breaking security isolation between users. We first present the
scope and background of the dissertation, and then discuss detailed challenges
in each platform we address. Based on the challenges, we present our approach
and summarize our contributions.
1.1 Scope
1.1.1 Cloud Infrastructure
Cloud computing [30, 93] enables rapid provisioning of shared resources such
as computation, storage, and network. It dramatically lowers the cost of IT,
and improves resource utilization, availability, reliability, and efficiency. For
example, using Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) [2], Google Compute
Engine [9], or Microsoft Azure [14], it takes seconds or less to allocate compu-
tation, storage, and networking to an application. Organizations can thereby
focus on core businesses without worrying about infrastructure maintenance.
Cloud providers present a “pay-as-you-go” model, so that cloud users are only
charged according to actual resource allocation. Users can thereby save costs by
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adjusting resources rapidly to meet fluctuating demand. (This is also called
“elastic scaling.”) Due to these advantages, cloud computing has become a
high-demand utility.
A cloud infrastructure is the collection of hardware and software that enables
cloud computing [93]. It contains both a physical layer and an abstraction layer.
The physical layer consists of hardware resources that are necessary to support
provided cloud services, and typically includes server, storage and network
components. The abstraction layer consists of the software deployed across the
physical layer, which manifests essential cloud service models. There are three
standard cloud service models as defined by National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) [93]:
• Software as a Service (SaaS) is a cloud service model that allows users to
access applications installed by the provider on the cloud infrastructure.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS) is a cloud service model that allows users to
deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired appli-
cations, using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools sup-
ported by the provider.
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is a cloud service model that allows users
to deploy and run arbitrary software, including operating systems and ap-
plications, and provides limited control of networking and storage com-
ponents.
These models expose different abstractions: SaaS provides a direct software
Application Programming Interface (API) or accessible user interface (e.g., web-
based email services); PaaS supports programming language and execution
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Figure 1.1: A typical cloud infrastructure with layered service models.
runtime; IaaS exposes virtualized computation, storage, and network. In a typi-
cal cloud infrastructure, these models often correspond to different layers in the
cloud stack, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1.1.2 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Platforms
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is a basic cloud service model that allows users
to deploy and run arbitrary software including operating systems and appli-
cations, and provides limited control of networking and storage components.
In the cloud infrastructure, IaaS platforms play a central role in managing and
multiplexing shared cloud resources, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. There are many
similarities between a traditional computer operating system (OS) and an IaaS
platform. An OS manages hardware resources including CPU, memory, disk,
and network, and provides abstractions such as processes, threads, and file sys-
tem. These abstractions greatly facilitate software development, and also pro-
vide secure and isolated execution environment for user applications.
Similarly, the major task of an IaaS platform is to efficiently manage data cen-
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ter resources, and provide abstractions for efficient and secure resource sharing.
The following are key abstractions provided by an IaaS platform:
• Virtual machine (VM): Computation resources are organized in virtual
machines (VMs), running on pools of hypervisors such as Xen [33],
KVM [82], Hyper-V [117], or VMware ESX/ESXi [53]. Virtualization en-
ables fast provisioning according to users’ varying demands, and also en-
sures security and resource isolation between mutually untrusted users.
• Software-defined Networking (SDN): Network resources are managed
with Software-defined Networking (SDN), a technology that allows net-
work administrators to initialize, control, change, and manage network
behavior dynamically via open interfaces. Leveraging SDN, IaaS plat-
forms can connect VMs running on different clusters into a Virtual Private
Network (VPN), and supports customized routing and firewall rules.
• Cloud storage: Storage resources are exposed as cloud storage, in which
data is stored in logical pools that span multiple servers, data centers, or
locations. Cloud storage can scale instantly, and handle fault-tolerance au-
tomatically. It can be used to store unstructured data such as ordinary files,
or structured data such as databases and key-value pairs. For structured
data, cloud storage also provides interfaces for performing data manipu-
lation and computation.
Major IaaS providers such as Amazon EC2 [2], Google Compute Engine [9],
and Microsoft Azure [14] have data centers in different locations world-wide.
These data centers are organized in Regions. Each region is a separate geo-
graphic area, and can have multiple isolated locations known as Availability
6
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Figure 1.2: Virtual machine vs. container.
Zones. Availability zones in the same region are physically isolated and have
independent failures, although they can communicate through low-latency net-
work links. When requesting resources from IaaS platforms, cloud users need to
specify the VM configuration (including CPU, memory, network, and storage)
and the location (region and availability zone) to place the VM. The resource
prices are different in different regions, and communications across availability
zones and regions are typically charged.
1.1.3 Containers Platforms
“Containers” is a term that has been used in different contexts, such as resource
containers [32], and security containers [101, 125]. With the OS-level virtual-
ization technology [110], a single OS kernel can support multiple isolated user-
space instances. Each user-space instance gets a separate view on the file sys-
tem, network stack, user IDs and groups, and processes. In this dissertation,
we use containers to refer to such user-space instances virtualized by the OS ker-
nel. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, the key difference between containers and VMs
is that containers share the underlying operating system (OS). This eliminates
the overhead of running multiple instances of the same operating system, and
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makes provisioning and bootstrapping a new container much faster than a tra-
ditional VM. Containers have been widely supported in different OSs, such as
Linux containers [12, 18], FreeBSD jails [80], and Solaris Zones [101]. In this dis-
sertation we mainly focus on Linux Containers, since it is the most mature and
widely used container platform.
Linux Containers
Figure 1.3 shows the Linux container architecture. Linux containers rely on a
set of technology provided by the Linux kernel [43] to isolate and manage con-
tainers:
• Namespaces: The Linux kernel provides advanced process isolation by
creating separate namespaces for containers. A namespace identifies in-
stances of global system resources that are isolated from one another, in-
cluding mount points, process IDs, and network configurations. Conse-
quently, processes in different namespaces can use the same resource si-
multaneously without creating a conflict.
• Control Groups (cgroups): The Linux kernel uses Control Groups (cgroups)
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to group processes for system resource management. A control group is a
collection of processes that are bound by the same criteria and associated
with a set of parameters or limits. Cgroups can be used to allocate CPU
time, system memory, and I/O bandwidth. They can also be used for
accounting or prioritizing resource usage of different processes.
• Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux): SELinux is a Linux kernel security
module that provides mechanisms for supporting access control security
policies. It confines accesses to system resources such as files, devices, sys-
tem calls that a process can issue, and commands that a user can execute.
Leveraging these in-kernel isolation mechanisms, Linux is able to virtualize
multiple OS instances for different groups of processes. Linux also provides
management interfaces to interact with the aforementioned kernel components
for construction and management of containers. Docker [7] is a software tech-
nology for managing and provisioning Linux containers. Docker containers are
Linux containers running with Docker images — packages of applications with
all dependencies including libraries, configuration files, and third party tools.
This enables great portability, as an application only needs to be packaged once
into a Docker image, and will be able to run anywhere such as public or private
clouds. Docker also provides tools to support efficient developing, deploying,
and re-using of Docker images.
The Role of Containers in Cloud Infrastructures
Due to their portability and performance, containers have become a key techno-
logical component of software distribution and maintenance. As a result, they
also play an important role in cloud infrastructures. Major public clouds all
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provide native container support. Containers are also one of the key building
blocks of a new cloud service model called serverless computing. Serverless com-
puting is a cloud computing execution model in which clouds provide runtime
environments to execute user programs on-demand, and dynamically manage
the allocation of physical resources [92]. In the serverless computing model,
user-defined functions are invoked in response to certain events. These user
functions are written without the notion of “servers.” (Hence the name server-
less.) They are charged based on the actual amount of resources consumed by
the execution, rather than on pre-purchased units of capacity. Since a function
can be invoked millions of times, it is important to provision the runtime ef-
ficiently with low overhead. Containers satisfy this requirement well, so most
existing serverless computing platforms use containers as the underlying mech-
anism for packaging and deploying user functions.
1.1.4 The Need for Security, Flexibility, and Efficiency
Cloud computing has become popular due to its flexibility and efficiency. Flexi-
bility refers to the support of user customization on cloud services and resource
management policies. Efficiency refers to the capability of improving perfor-
mance and reducing cost of resources including hardware, energy, man power,
money, and time. However, the model of sharing resources in a centralized
place raises security concerns. Security means the protection of user compu-
tation and resources against unauthorized access, data leakage, and malicious
attacks or damages. Cloud providers get access to user data directly, and in-
formation can be leaked to other users sharing the same cloud infrastructure.
Furthermore, clouds tend to attract more attacks since they maintain valuable
data from many companies. For example, Dropbox experienced a data leak-
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age in 2014, when over 7 million user passwords were stolen by hackers [10].
Vulnerabilities in cloud architectures such as hardware, hypervisors, and inse-
cure cloud APIs have also been discovered, all of which can potentially cause
information leakage [11].
To improve security, cloud providers typically pose limitations on how cloud
resources can be consumed and how underlying platforms are implemented,
sacrificing flexibility or efficiency. For example, due to the concern of contain-
ers isolation, public clouds provide container services by running containers in
VMs, at the cost of performance and resource efficiency. Although IaaS plat-
forms provide resources in VMs, users are forced to treat them as physical ma-
chines, and advanced resource management techniques enabled by virtualiza-
tion like VM migration [51] and consolidation [124] are generally not allowed.
Many companies choose to run their own private clouds, maintaining physi-
cal control over the equipment instead of using off-site machines under third-
party control. Although private clouds provide better security and customiza-
tion support, they lose the efficiency of public clouds and can cost more. The
challenge of achieving sufficient security, flexibility, and efficiency is one of the
fundamental problems in cloud infrastructures.
1.2 Challenges
The need for security, flexibility, and efficiency presents a challenge to cloud
infrastructures. Security isolation is typically achieved by limiting user cus-
tomization, compromising flexibility. Crossing security isolation boundaries
generally incurs performance overhead, affecting efficiency. Increased flexibil-
ity can lead to weaker security isolation. In this dissertation we address the
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following research question: How to offer flexibility and efficiency as well as strong
security in cloud infrastructures? In particular, we address two important plat-
forms in cloud infrastructures: the containers and Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS) platforms. In this section we describe challenges inherent to each plat-
form.
1.2.1 Lack of Security and Flexibility in Containers Platforms
Although containers platforms have outstanding efficiency, they do not provide
sufficient security and flexibility. Specifically, they have the following problems:
• Shared kernel attack surface: All containers on the same host share the
same monolithic kernel; if one container is compromised, all containers on
the same kernel are put under risk.
• Kernel incompatibility: Containers often run into kernel compatibility is-
sues where the application requires some kernel function that is not avail-
able on the host kernel.
• Lack of kernel customization: Due to concerns about application isola-
tion, containers are generally not allowed to install their own kernel mod-
ules, a limitation for applications that requires customized kernels.
An underlying challenge here is that containers are forced to share a kernel
over which they do not have any control, which fundamentally limits security
and flexibility. An often-used solution is to run containers in VMs, which is how
public clouds such as Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure provide container ser-
vices. However, VMs sacrifice scalability, performance, and resource efficiency
compared to lightweight containers.
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1.2.2 Lack of Flexibility and Efficiency in IaaS Platforms
For various reasons including security isolation, public IaaS clouds do not ex-
pose many useful APIs enabled by the virtualization infrastructure for efficient
resource management, limiting flexibility and efficiency. Given additional man-
agement interfaces, applications could easily migrate VMs across availability
zones in response to diurnal workloads or changing prices, adjust the resources
given to particular VMs in response to load changes, deploy applications across
multiple cloud providers for increased fault tolerance, and so on. Control over
storage and network routing would further improve customizability for opti-
mal performance. However, there are three major challenges:
• Heterogeneity in cloud infrastructures: Different cloud providers use in-
frastructures based on heterogeneous hypervisors, network, and storage.
For example, Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine, and Microsoft Azure
use Xen, KVM, and Hyper-V respectively. They provide different types of
VM configurations, and require diverse device drivers and VM images.
Furthermore, the network and storage infrastructures of different clouds
are typically isolated. There is no widely accepted standard on the cloud
API for interoperability. So once an application is deployed into a cloud,
it is very hard to move it to another. This problem is generally called the
vendor lock-in problem.
• Lack of privileged control: Although IaaS cloud platforms are typically
built with virtualization technology, they only expose high-level abstrac-
tions and limit many useful administrative APIs from user access. As a
result, cloud users cannot perform administrative tasks as in their own
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data center.
• Lack of common resource management: Different cloud providers do not
have a standard API to communicate with each other. Thus, if an appli-
cation is deployed to multiple clouds, users have to implement their own
resource management platform. It is non-trivial to consider the hetero-
geneity in computation, network, and storage infrastructures when moni-
toring and managing applications across different clouds.
1.3 Approach
1.3.1 Separating Protection and Management
The problem of achieving security, flexibility, and efficiency is not unique to
cloud infrastructures. In fact, this is a general problem in systems that support
multi-tenancy: a capability with which a single instance of a software system
serves multiple tenants. Here a tenant is a group of users or applications that
share a common access with specific privileges to the software system. Multi-
tenant systems typically provide security isolation between different tenants,
and also customization support for each tenant’s specific needs. Therefore, they
also need to deal with the problem of balancing security, flexibility, and effi-
ciency.
Our approach is inspired by an architecture used to address a similar prob-
lem in a multi-tenant system—the operating system (OS). A traditional OS im-
plements high-level abstractions such as virtual memory and inter-process com-
munications. These abstractions make programming easier, but can also limit
performance and flexibility. The exokernel architecture [57] was proposed as a
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new OS architecture that minimizes the code base running in kernel mode, and
provides support of OS customization. Exokernels are small kernels primarily
concerned with the sharing of physical resources. Other OS functionality is im-
plemented through so-called Library OSs or through shared services running as
processes [69]. Security isolation is improved due to a smaller size of Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) and attack surface. And user control is improved as well
since most OS functionalities are implemented in the same privilege level as ap-
plications, and a LibOS is dedicated to a single application for customization.
A fundamental principle in exokernel architecture is separating protection and
management [78]. This approach is called the exokernel approach. Exokernels pro-
vide primitives at the lowest level for protection, so that one application cannot
easily compromise or interfere with another. Meanwhile, exokernels impose
minimal restrictions on resource management, so applications can have great
flexibility on implementing their own abstractions and policies for managing
resources.
The principle of separating protection and management can be applied gen-
erally to multi-tenant systems for improving security, flexibility, and efficiency.
With the exokernel approach, a multi-tenant system can be structured with two
layers, as illustrated in Figure 1.4. The lower layer, which we call the protection
layer, multiplexes resources and focuses only on protection and security isola-
tion, while the upper layer, which we call the management layer, is composed of
management components that are dedicated to each tenant for resource man-
agement. Only the protection layer is shared by different tenants, and it is kept
relatively simple and small since it does not provide direct application function-
ality support. All application-oriented features are provided in components of
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Figure 1.4: Separating protection and management in multi-tenant systems.
the management layer, which are dedicated to each tenant. This architecture
brings many benefits:
• Security: Security isolation is enforced by a relatively simple and small
protection layer, which reduces the complexity of the code base and com-
munication interface. Thus, security isolation is easier to verify and main-
tain.
• Flexibility: Since application-oriented functions are provided in dedi-
cated components of the management layer, applications have the free-
dom to customize them for their own purpose without affecting others or
compromising security isolation.
• Efficiency: The dedication of the management layer eliminates the re-
quirement of implementing security isolation, enabling many perfor-
mance optimization opportunities that are hard to implement when iso-
lation is required. For example, in the exokernel architecture, LibOS can
achieve better system call performance than traditional OS by allowing
direct function calls to system call handlers.
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1.3.2 Limitations
The benefits of the exokernel approach do not come without costs. Since the pro-
tection layer does not provide high-level abstractions, its protection policies can
only be generic and strict, and it cannot make trade-off without knowing high-
level requirements that matter to tenants. Tenants that require more sophisti-
cated security policies related to higher-level abstractions need to implement
their own protection mechanisms within management components. This prob-
lem can be further complicated by the security policies that involve multiple
isolated tenants. In this case, multiple management components need collabo-
ration to maintain a consistent and secure abstraction, which increases system
complexity.
Another problem caused by the exokernel approach is that security isolation
boundaries among different management components can incur performance
overhead. Tenants that collaborate tightly with each other might want to share
the same management component, and implement their own security isolation
mechanisms. However, it is non-trivial to determine in what situations two
tenants should be isolated with different management components, or share the
same management component and implement their own isolation mechanisms.
Further research is required to provide a general guideline for addressing the
trade-off.
1.4 Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation is applying the exokernel approach
to separate protection and management in cloud infrastructures to improve se-
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curity, flexibility, and efficiency. By studying two important platforms in cloud
infrastructures, the containers and the IaaS platforms, we demonstrate that the
exokernel approach can be applied with backward compatibility and incremen-
tal deployment. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
First, we show how separating protection and management in containers
platforms improves security and flexibility without sacrificing efficiency. We
present X-Containers, a new exokernel+LibOS architecture that is fully compat-
ible with Linux containers and provides competitive or superior performance
to native Docker Containers as well as other LibOS designs. We untangle the
various functions of processes, and in particular use processes for concurrency
while proposing X-Containers for security isolation. We compare two different
implementations of the X-Container architecture. And finally, we evaluate the
efficacy of both implementations of X-Containers and compare them to native
Docker and other LibOS implementations (Unikernel [89] and Graphene [115]).
Second, we show how separating protection and management in IaaS plat-
forms improves flexibility and efficiency without sacrificing security. We pro-
pose a Library Cloud abstraction for user-level resource management. We show
how nested virtualization can be leveraged to handle heterogeneity and imple-
ment a Library Cloud without the support of underlying cloud providers. We
also propose storage and networking solutions for supporting efficient VM mi-
gration in a Library Cloud, and show how they can be implemented efficiently.
We evaluate a prototype of the Library Cloud abstraction—the Supercloud, and
demonstrate how applications can benefit from the Library Cloud using case
studies of geographically shifting workloads and virtual machine consolidation.
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1.5 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present X-
Containers, a new containers platform designed with the exokernel approach.
In Chapter 3 we present Library Cloud, a new cloud abstraction enabling user-
level resource management. We discuss related work in Chapter 4, and future
research directions in Chapter 5. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS SECURE, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFICIENT CONTAINERS
PLATFORM: X-CONTAINERS
2.1 Introduction
Containers platforms have problems in security and flexibility. If one container
is compromised, all containers on the same kernel are put under risk. Due to the
concern of application isolation, containers are generally not allowed to install
their own kernel modules, a limitation for applications that require customized
kernels. Nor can kernels be easily tuned to optimize it for the application at
hand.
An oft-used solution is to run each container, packaged with an operating
system, in its own virtual machine (VMs). This is how public clouds such as
Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure provide container and serverless services.
However, VMs sacrifice scalability, performance, and resource efficiency com-
pared to lightweight containers.
In this chapter we apply the exokernel approach to separate protection and
management in containers platforms, and propose a new architecture called X-
Containers. We demonstrate that the Linux kernel can be modified to serve as
a highly efficient LibOS and provide full compatibility to existing applications
and kernel modules, while hypervisors can be used as the exokernels to run and
isolate them.
Each X-Container hosts an application with a dedicated and possibly cus-
tomized LibOS based on a Linux kernel. An X-Container can support one or
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more user processes, and these run together with the LibOS at the same privi-
lege level. Different processes still have their own address spaces for resource
management and compatibility, but they no longer provide secure isolation
from one another: processes are used for concurrency, while X-Containers pro-
vide isolation.
The X-Container platform automatically optimizes the binary of the appli-
cation during runtime to improve performance by rewriting costly system calls
into much cheaper function calls into the LibOS. X-Containers have 3× raw sys-
tem call throughput compared to native Docker containers and is competitive
or outperforms native containers for other benchmarks.
The X-Container platform also outperforms architectures specialized for
containers and serverless services. We have run the wrk web benchmark with
NGINX on X-Container, Unikernel [89], and Graphene [115]. Under this bench-
mark, X-Container has comparable performance to Unikernel and about twice
the throughput of Graphene. However, when running PHP and MySQL, X-
Container has approximately 3× the performance of Unikernel.
While X-Containers borrows much of the software base of Linux, the design
and implementation has to address various challenges. For this chapter, we
evaluate two contrasting designs. In the first, we run the Linux kernel in user
mode alongside user processes on top of Xen. This requires extensive modifi-
cations to the Xen hypervisor but does not require special hardware support.
Indeed, this design can run both on bare-metal and inside virtual machines in
the public cloud. In the second design, we run user processes in kernel mode
alongside the Linux kernel exploiting hardware virtualization support—this de-
sign can run on any hypervisor and still securely isolates different containers.
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In both cases, only the architecture-dependent part of Linux has to be modified.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We present X-Containers, a new exokernel-based container architecture
that is compatible with Linux containers and that provides competitive or
superior performance and isolation to native Docker Containers as well
as other LibOS designs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ar-
chitecture that supports secure isolation of containers without sacrificing
compatibility, portability, or performance;
• We untangle the various functions of processes, and in particular use pro-
cesses for concurrency while proposing X-Containers for security isola-
tion;
• We compare two different implementations of the X-Container architec-
ture;
• We evaluate the efficacy of both implementations of X-Containers and
compare them to native Docker and other LibOSs (Unikernel and
Graphene).
2.2 X-Containers as a New Security Paradigm
2.2.1 Kernel and Process Isolation
Modern operating systems (OS) that support multiple users and processes sup-
port various types of isolation, including:
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• Kernel Isolation ensures that a process cannot compromise the integrity of
the kernel nor read confidential information that is kept in the kernel.
• Process Isolation ensures that one process cannot easily access or compro-
mise another.
The cost of securing kernel isolation can be significant. System calls to access
kernel code are orders of magnitude slower than function calls into a library.
Moreover, often data copies are performed in the I/O stack for the sake of elim-
inating data dependencies between the kernel and user mode code. Meanwhile,
there is a trend to push more and more functionality into the OS kernel, and it
has become increasingly harder to defend against attacks on the kernel [62].
Modern monolithic OS kernels such as Linux have become a huge code base
with complicated services, device drivers, and system call interfaces. It is im-
practical to verify the security of such a complicated system, and new vulnera-
bilities are continually being discovered (currently there are more than 500 se-
curity vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel [13]).
Process isolation is similarly problematic [75]. For one, this type of isolation
typically depends on kernel isolation due to how it is implemented and en-
forced. But perhaps more importantly, processes are not intended solely for se-
curity isolation. They are primarily used for resource sharing and concurrency
support, and to support this modern OSs provide interfaces that transcend iso-
lation, including shared memory, shared file systems, signaling, user groups,
and debugging hooks. These mechanisms lay out a large attack surface, which
causes many vulnerabilities for applications that rely on processes for security
isolation.
For example, Apache webservers spawn child processes with the same user
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ID. A compromised process can easily access other processes’ memory by lever-
aging the debugging interface (such as ptrace) or the proc file system. With-
out careful configuration, a compromised process might also access the shared
file system and steal information from configuration files or even databases. Fi-
nally, there exists privilege escalation attacks [102] so that a hacker can acquire
root privilege to defeat most of the process isolation mechanisms without com-
promising the kernel.
Indeed, few existing multi-client applications rely on processes for isolating
mutually untrusted clients, in particular, they do not dedicate a process to each
client. Many do not even use processes at all—popular production systems such
as NGINX webserver, Apache Tomcat, MySQL, and MongoDB use event-driven
model or multi-threading instead of multi-processing. Multi-process applica-
tions such as Apache webserver use a process pool for concurrency instead of
security—each process has multiple threads and can be re-used for serving dif-
ferent clients. These applications implement client isolation in the application
logic, leveraging mechanisms such as role-based access control, authentication,
and encryption.
There are, however, exceptions. The SSH daemon relies on process isola-
tion to isolate different users. Also, if there are multiple applications using the
same MySQL daemon on the same kernel, the combination of process isolation
and client isolation built into MySQL provides the applications with security in
case some applications are compromised—each application poses as a different
client to MySQL.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of isolation boundaries in various architectures.
2.2.2 Rethinking the Isolation Boundary
Processes are useful for resource management and concurrency, but ideally se-
curity isolation should be decoupled from the process model. Indeed, other iso-
lation mechanisms have been introduced. Figure 2.1 illustrates isolation bound-
aries in various alternative architectures. Container isolation separates name
spaces on top of a kernel such that each container appears to be its own instan-
tiation of that kernel. However, the technology used is essentially the same as
process isolation—any isolation that can be accomplished with containers can
be accomplished without. It does not solve the problem of the kernel being a
large and vulnerable TCB with a large attack surface due to the many available
system calls.
From a security point-of-view, running containers in individual VMs, each
with a dedicated kernel of its own, is a good solution. The TCB now consists
of a relatively small hypervisor with a much smaller attack surface. Unfortu-
nately, overhead is high because of redundant resource consumption and isola-
tion boundaries. Nonetheless, this is now the de facto solution for multi-tenant
container clouds. In order to deal with the high cost of this solution, more exper-
imental systems such as Unikernel [89], EbbRT [105], OSv [19], and Dune [34] are
lightweight OS kernel alternatives designed to run inside VMs. Unfortunately,
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these do not support existing applications well due to lack of binary-level com-
patibility. Also, typically they can only support single-process applications.
In a microkernel architecture, most of the traditional OS services run in sep-
arate user processes alongside application processes. Such architectures can
provide binary compatibility. However, because different applications share
those OS services, a compromised OS service breaks isolation between the
applications—the TCB and attack surface are not reduced. Also, system call
overhead tends to be large.
In this chapter we propose the X-Container as a paradigm for security iso-
lation between applications. Its architecture is based on the exokernel archi-
tecture, having a small kernel attack surface and low system call overhead.
An X-Container can have multiple processes—for resource management and
concurrency—but not isolation; to isolate users or applications it is necessary to
spawn multiple X-Containers. Eliminating isolation within an X-Container can
reduce system call overhead to that of a function call.
X-Containers use an “X-LibOS” based on a standard OS Kernel with full bi-
nary compatibility. In our implementation, the X-LibOS is derived from Linux,
and only required changes to the architecture-dependent part of Linux. The ad-
vantages of using a standard kernel are many: Linux is highly optimized and
mature, and is being developed by an active community. X-Containers fully
leverage this to its fullest, but relies for isolation on a much smaller “X-Kernel.”
In our implementation, the X-Kernel is derived from Xen.
Different applications should be placed in different X-Containers. To illus-
trate what exactly we mean by this, consider two applications that each use a
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Figure 2.2: Alternate configurations of two applications that use MySQL.
MySQL database. One option would be to create X-Containers for each appli-
cation plus a third X-Container dedicated to MySQL (Figure 2.2a). That is, this
option treats MySQL as its own isolated application. MySQL internally contains
access control logic to securely separate the tables of the two applications.
A more secure configuration would create two instances of MySQL, one
for each application, each running in its own X-Container, resulting in four X-
Containers total (Figure 2.2b). This would remove reliance on access control
logic within the MySQL implementation and thus strictly increase security of
the configuration. In addition, this option would provide better customizabil-
ity, both of the MySQL servers and the operating system kernels that support
them.
However, notice how each application has its own MySQL instance. Each
application relies on its MySQL instance to store its data durably and respond
correctly to queries, while conversely each MySQL instance is dedicated and has
nothing lose by being compromised by its own application. Therefore, we can
safely deploy only two X-Containers, each containing application logic along
with its dedicated MySQL instance (Figure 2.2c). This option provides signifi-
cantly better performance than the three or four X-Container configurations (see
evaluations in Section 2.5.4).
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2.2.3 Threat Model of Container Applications
For applications running on X-Containers, or containers in general, we can con-
sider two kinds of threats: external and internal, and these may possibly col-
lude. One type of external threat is posed by messages designed to corrupt the
application logic. This threat is countered by application and operating system
logic and is identical for standard containers and X-Containers. Another type
of external threats may try to break through the isolation barrier of a container.
In the case of standard containers, this isolation barrier is provided by the un-
derlying general purpose operating system kernel, which has a large TCB and,
due to the large number of system calls, a large attack surface. X-Containers,
in contrast, rely for isolation on a small X-Kernel that is dedicated to providing
isolation. It has a small TCB and a small number of hypervisor calls that are
relatively easy to secure. We believe that X-Containers provide strictly better
protection to external threats than standard containers.
Internal threats are created by an application relying on third party libraries
or, as illustrated by the MySQL example above, by third party services deployed
within the same container. In a Linux container, applications trust Linux to
implement isolation between processes owned by different user accounts. X-
Containers explicitly do not provide secure isolation between processes in the
same container. Applications that rely on secure isolation barriers between pro-
cesses should either use a standard VM and Linux solution or re-organize the
application such that conflicting processes run in different X-Containers. The
latter would provide better security but requires more implementation effort.
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2.3 Design of X-Containers
2.3.1 Design Goals
Ideally, containers should provide a secure and self-contained environment for
running applications. Following are key principles for designing an architecture
for running application containers securely:
Self-sufficiency and Customizability: A container should contain all the de-
pendencies of an application. This includes not only libraries, file system layout,
and third-party tools, but also the OS kernel. A container should be able to use
a customized OS kernel and load its own kernel modules.
Compatibility: A container platform ideally should not require changes to ap-
plications. Binary level compatibility allows users to deploy containers imme-
diately without re-writing or even re-compiling their applications.
Isolation with small TCB: Containers should be securely isolated from one
another. Although it is necessary to share privileged software to access shared
physical resources, that software must be trusted and should be small.
Portability: A key advantage of containers is that they are packaged once and
then can be run everywhere, including bare-metal machines and virtualized
cloud environments.
Scalability and Efficiency: Application containers should be lightweight and
executed with small overhead.
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2.3.2 Architecture
Figure 2.3 illustrates the X-Container architecture. The X-Kernel is an exokernel
running in kernel mode. Different applications run in different containers, each
with their own customized X-LibOS. An application and its X-LibOS run at the
same privilege level for good efficiency.
X-Kernel: The X-Kernel is responsible for essential services such as physical
resource access and sharing, memory virtualization, and inter-container com-
munication. The Application Binary Interface (ABI) of the X-Kernel is similar
to a type-1 VM hypervisor [99]. The X-Kernel comprises a small TCB with a
restricted set of system calls, which makes the attack surface much smaller than
that of a full-fledged traditional OS kernel.
X-LibOS: The X-LibOS provides the same ABI as a traditional OS kernel to the
local application. The X-LibOS provides the application with processes to sup-
port convenient resource management and concurrency. Thus they each have
their own virtual memory address space by using different page tables, but as
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the X-LibOS is not protected from the application, the virtual memory address
spaces are not securely isolated.
2.4 Implementation
We use a hypervisor to serve as X-Kernel. We modified a Linux kernel distribu-
tion into X-LibOS that allows it to run in the same privilege mode as applica-
tions. We explored two possible implementation choices:
1. Para-Virtualized (PV) X-Containers run X-LibOS and applications in user
mode. It requires modification of the hypervisor (running in kernel mode),
but it does not require special hardware support and can be deployed on
bare-metal machines as well as in VMs in public clouds.
2. Hardware Virtualized (HV) X-Containers run X-LibOS and applications in
kernel mode. It requires hardware virtualization support, but works with
unmodified hypervisors.
For the first implementation choice, we have based the X-Kernel implemen-
tation on Xen [33]. It is open source and support of its paravirtualization inter-
face in Linux is mature. For the second implementation choice, we use unmod-
ified Xen with hardware virtualization as the X-Kernel, but other hypervisors
could be used as well. For example, we have run HV X-Containers on KVM in
Google Compute Engine.
Both implementation choices are of pragmatic interest. The first implemen-
tation allows greater control in how X-Containers are managed. For example, it
allows running multiple X-Containers securely isolated from one another in the
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same VM. Running multiple X-Containers on a single high performance VM
will perform better and is more cost effective than running each X-Container
in its own, smaller VM. Also, Xen VM management functionalities such as
live migration, consolidation, and memory ballooning are supported for PV
X-Containers as an added bonus—features not well supported in Linux Con-
tainers.
When hardware virtualization is available, the second implementation tends
to have better performance. However, in virtualized environments an HV X-
Container needs to take over the whole VM unless nested hardware virtualiza-
tion is supported. VMs in public clouds generally do not expose nested hard-
ware virtualization.
For the experiments, we derived both versions of X-LibOS from Linux ker-
nel 4.4.44. The modifications to the kernel are in the architecture-dependent
layer and transparent to other layers in the kernel. We focused on applications
running in x86-64 long mode.
Using Linux gives us binary compatibility, but in addition the Linux kernel
is also highly customizable. It has hundreds of booting parameters, thousands
of compilation configurations, and many fine-grained runtime tuning knobs.
Since most kernel functions can be configured as kernel modules and loaded
during runtime, a customized Linux kernel can be highly optimized. For ex-
ample, for applications that run a single thread, such as many event-driven
applications, disabling multi-core and Symmetric Multiprocessing (SMP) sup-
port can eliminate unnecessary locking and TLB shoot-downs, which greatly
improves performance. Depending on the workload, applications can config-
ure the Linux scheduler with different scheduling policies. For many applica-
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tions, the potential of the Linux kernel has not been fully exploited due to lack
of control over kernel configurations or having to share the kernel with other
applications. Turning the Linux kernel into a LibOS and dedicating it to a single
application can release all this potential.
2.4.1 Para-Virtualized (PV) X-Containers
Background: Xen Paravirtualization
We implemented PV X-Containers based on the Xen paravirtualization (PV) ar-
chitecture [33]. The PV architecture enables running multiple concurrent Linux
VMs (PV guests or Domain-Us) on the same physical machine without support
for hardware-assisted virtualization, but guest kernels require modest changes
to work with the underlying hypervisor. In this section we review key technolo-
gies in Xen’s PV architecture and its limitations on x86-64 platforms.
In the PV architecture, Xen runs in the most privileged mode (the kernel
mode) and both guest kernels and user processes run with fewer privileges.
All sensitive system instructions that could affect security isolation, such as in-
stalling new page tables and changing segment selectors, are executed by Xen.
Guest kernels request those services by performing hypercalls, which are val-
idated by Xen before being served. Exceptions and interrupts are virtualized
through efficient event channels.
For device I/O, instead of emulating hardware, Xen defines a simpler split
driver model. There is a privileged domain (normally Domain-0, the host do-
main created by Xen during booting) that gets access to hardware devices and
multiplexes the device so it can be shared by other Domain-Us. The Domain-
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U installs a front-end driver, which is connected to a corresponding back-end
driver in Domain-0 through Xen’s event channels, and data is transferred using
shared memory (asynchronous buffer descriptor rings).
Xen’s PV interface has been widely supported by main-line Linux kernels—
it was one of the most efficient virtualization technologies on x86-32 platforms.
Because there are four different privilege levels for memory segmentation pro-
tection (ring-0 to ring-3), we can run Xen, guest kernels, and user processes
in different privilege levels for isolation. System calls can be performed with-
out the involvement of Xen. However, the PV architecture faces a fundamental
challenge on x86-64 platforms. Due to the elimination of segment protections
in x86-64 long mode, we can only run both the guest kernel and user processes
in user mode. To protect the guest kernel from user processes, the guest ker-
nel needs to be isolated in another address space. Each system call needs to be
forwarded by the Xen hypervisor as a virtual exception, and incurs a switch of
page table and TLB flush. This involves significant overhead and is one of the
main reasons why 64bit Linux VMs prefer to run fully virtualized nowadays, in
hardware virtualization instead of paravirtualization.
Eliminating Kernel Isolation
The PV X-Container architecture is similar to the Xen PV architecture, with one
key difference being that the guest kernel (i.e., the X-LibOS) is not isolated from
user processes. Instead, they use the same segment selectors and page table
privilege level so that kernel access no longer requires a switch between (guest)
user mode and (guest) kernel mode, and system calls can be performed with
function calls.
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This leads to a complication: Xen needs to know whether the CPU is in guest
user mode or guest kernel mode for correct syscall forwarding and interrupt
delivery. Xen does this using a flag that it can maintain because all user-kernel
mode switches are handled by Xen. However, in X-LibOS, with lightweight sys-
tem calls (Section 2.4.3) and interrupt handling (Section 2.4.1), guest user-kernel
mode switches do not involve the X-Kernel anymore. Instead, the X-Kernel de-
termines whether the CPU is executing kernel or process code by checking the
location of the current stack pointer. As in the normal Linux memory layout,
X-LibOS is mapped into the top half of the virtual memory address space and is
shared by all processes. The user process memory is mapped to the lower half
of the address space. Thus, the most significant bit in the stack pointer indicates
whether it is in guest kernel mode or guest user mode.
In paravirtualized Linux, the “global” bit in the page table is disabled so
that switching between different address spaces causes a full TLB flush. This is
not needed for X-LibOS, thus the mappings for the X-LibOS and X-Kernel both
have the global bit set in the page table. Switching between different processes
running on the same X-LibOS do not require a full TLB flush, which greatly
improves the performance of address translation. Context switches between
different X-Containers do trigger a full TLB flush.
Because the kernel code is no longer protected, kernel routines would not
need a dedicated stack if there were only one process. However, the X-LibOS
supports multiple processes. Therefore, we still need dedicated kernel stacks in
the kernel context, and when performing a system call, a switch from user stack
to kernel stack is necessary.
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Lightweight Interrupt Handling
In the Xen PV architecture, interrupts are delivered as asynchronous events.
There is a variable shared by Xen and the guest kernel that indicates whether
there is any event pending. If so, the guest kernel issues a hypercall into Xen
to have those events delivered. In the X-Container architecture, the X-LibOS is
able to emulate the interrupt stack frame when seeing any pending events and
jump directly into interrupt handlers without trapping into the X-Kernel first.
To return from an interrupt handler, an iret instruction is used to reset code
and stack segments, stack pointer, flags, and instruction pointer together. Inter-
rupts must also be enabled atomically. But in the Xen PV architecture virtual
interrupts can only be enabled by writing to a memory location, which cannot
be performed atomically with other operations. To guarantee atomicity and se-
curity when switching privilege levels, Xen provides a hypercall for implement-
ing iret. In the X-Container architecture, we can implement iret completely
in user mode.
There are two challenges when implementing iret in user mode: First, all
general registers must be restored before jumping back to the return address, so
temporary values such as the stack and instruction pointers can only be saved
in memory instead of registers. Second, without issuing hypercalls, virtual in-
terrupts cannot be enabled atomically with other operations. So the code ma-
nipulating the temporary values saved in memory must support reentrancy.
There are two cases to consider. When returning to a place running on the
kernel mode stack, the X-LibOS pushes temporary registers on the destination
stack including the return address, and switches the stack pointer before en-
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abling interrupts so preemption is guaranteed to be safe. Then the code jumps
to the return address by using a simple ret instruction. When returning to the
user mode stack, the user mode stack pointer might not be valid, so X-LibOS
saves temporary values in the kernel stack for system call handling, enables
interrupts, and then executes the iret instruction.
Similar to iret, the sysret instruction, which is used for returning from a
system call handler, is optimized without trapping to kernel mode. It is easier
to implement sysret because it can leverage certain temporary registers.
2.4.2 Hardware Virtualized (HV) X-Containers
The generality of PV X-Containers comes with the cost of performing all sensi-
tive system instructions through hypercalls, including page table manipulations
and context switches. Hardware Virtualized (HV) X-Containers eliminate this
cost if hardware virtualization support is available.
With hardware virtualization support, X-LibOS can run in kernel mode and
execute most privilege instructions directly, which greatly improves perfor-
mance of page table management and context switches. The major challenge
comes from running user processes in kernel mode as well. In addition to mod-
ifying the memory and CPU management components in the Linux kernel so
that user processes can run in kernel mode, we also need to change how in-
terrupts and exceptions are handled. Because the CPU delivers interrupts and
exceptions directly in HV X-Containers, X-Kernel does not have control over
how they are handled. The default behavior on the x86 platforms is that no
stack switch happens when there is an interrupt or exception in kernel mode.
This implies that the interrupt handler can execute on the user stack directly,
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which breaks a basic assumption in user code and kernel code: the data on the
user stack can be compromised, and much code in the Linux kernel would need
to change in order to handle such a situation correctly.
Fortunately, x86-64 introduces a new interrupt stack-switch mechanism,
called the Interrupt Stack Table (IST), to force a stack switch on interrupts and
exceptions. By specifying a tag in the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), the CPU
will switch to a new stack pointer even if the privilege level is not changed.
However, nested interrupts become a problem in this case if the same stack
pointer is re-used. We solved this problem by specifying a temporary stack
pointer in the IST. Right after entering the interrupt handler, we copy the stack
frame to the normal kernel stack so that the same stack pointer can be used for
nested interrupts.
2.4.3 Lightweight System Calls
In the x86-64 architecture, user mode programs perform system calls using the
syscall instruction, which transfers control to a routine in kernel mode. The
X-Kernel immediately transfers control to the X-LibOS, guaranteeing binary
level compatibility so that existing applications can run on the X-LibOS with-
out any modification.
Because the X-LibOS and the process both run in the same privilege level, it
is more efficient to invoke system call handlers directly. However, a challenge
arises from the setting of the GS segment. The Linux kernel stores per-CPU
variables in the GS segment. This segment is set by a swapgs instruction on
entering the kernel for every system call, and re-set before returning to the user
program. Unfortunately, the swapgs instruction is only valid in kernel mode.
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It is possible to change the per-CPU variable placement by avoiding the use
of segmentation. But to keep the change to Linux kernel minimal, we instead
disable the GS segment switch when entering or leaving the X-LibOS, keeping
the GS segment valid all the time. x86-64 applications might use the FS segment
for thread local storage, but the GS segment is typically not touched. We have
not yet seen any application that needs a customized GS segment.
Another challenge comes from the mechanism of enabling lightweight sys-
tem calls. X-LibOS stores a system call entry table in the vsyscall page, which
is mapped to a fixed virtual memory address in every process. Updating X-
LibOS will not affect the location of the system call entry table. Using this entry
table, applications can optimize their libraries and binaries for X-Containers by
patching the source code to change system calls into function calls, as most ex-
isting LibOSs do. But it significantly increases deployment complexity, and it
cannot handle third-party tools and libraries that do not have source code avail-
able. To avoid re-writing or re-compiling the application, we implemented an
online Automatic Binary Optimization Module (ABOM) in the X-Kernel for PV
X-containers and in X-LibOS for HV X-Containers. It replaces syscall instruc-
tions with function calls automatically on the fly. There are many challenges for
in-place binary replacement:
1. Binary level equivalence: the total length of the patched instructions can-
not be changed, and the program must perform exactly the same functions
even when the application code jumps into the middle of a patched block.
2. Position-independence: we can only call an absolute address stored in
memory or a register, instead of a relative address displacement, because
libraries such as glibc are loaded in different locations for different pro-
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cesses.
3. Minimum performance impact: it is impractical to scan the whole binary
when loading the application or during runtime.
4. Handling read-only pages: most of the binary code is mapped read-only
in memory. The binary replacement cannot trigger copy-on-write mecha-
nisms in X-LibOS, otherwise potentially many copies of the same memory
page may be created for different processes.
5. Concurrency safety: the same piece of code can be shared by multiple
CPUs running different threads or processes. The replacement should be
done atomically without affecting or stopping other CPUs.
6. Swapping safety: memory swapping may happen during the replace-
ment. The system should be able to detect and handle it correctly without
compromising memory or causing high performance overhead.
ABOM performs binary replacement on the fly when receiving a syscall re-
quest from user processes, avoiding scanning the entire binary file. Before for-
warding the syscall request, ABOM checks the binary around the syscall in-
struction and see if it matches any pattern that it recognizes. If it does, ABOM
temporarily disables the write-protection bit in the CR-0 register, so that code
running in kernel mode can change any memory page even if it is mapped
read-only in the page table. ABOM then performs the binary patch with atomic
cmpxchg instructions. Since each cmpxchg instruction can handle at most eight
bytes, if we need to modify more than eight bytes, we need to make sure that
any intermediate state of the binary is still valid for the sake of concurrency
safety. The patch is mostly transparent to X-LibOS, except that the page table
dirty bit will be set for read-only pages. X-LibOS can choose to either ignore
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those dirty pages, or flush them to disk so that the same patch is not needed in
the future.
A bigger problem is to handle swapping safety. Especially in PV X-
Containers, although the decision of memory swapping is made by X-LibOS,
all page table manipulations are done through hypercalls in the X-Kernel. X-
Kernel can lock the page table to prevent swapping during binary replacement,
but this can cause higher performance overhead. We ended up implementing
the binary replacement as follows: binary replacement runs in the context of
system calls, so if the target page is swapped out right before the replacement,
writing to the page will trigger a page fault. ABOM captures this page fault and
continues to forward the system call without propagating it to the page fault
handler of X-LibOS. ABOM will try to patch the same location next time when
it is executed.
Figure 2.4 illustrates two patterns of binary code that ABOM recognizes. To
perform a system call, programs typically set the system call number in the rax
or eax register with a mov instruction, and then execute the syscall instruc-
tion. The syscall instruction is two bytes, and the mov instruction is 5 or 7
bytes depending on the size of operands. We replace these two instructions with
a single call instruction with an absolute address stored in memory, which
can be implemented with 7 bytes. The memory address of the entry points is
retrieved from the system call entry table stored in the vsyscall page. The
binary replacement only need to be performed once for each place.
With 7-byte replacements, we merge two instructions into one. There is a
rare case that the program jumps directly to the location of the original syscall
instruction after setting the rax register somewhere else. After the replacement,
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00000000000eb6a0 <__read>:   
eb6a9:       b8 00 00 00 00          mov $0x0,%eax   
eb6ae:       0f 05                   syscall
00000000000eb6a0 <__read>:   
eb6a9:       ff 14 25 08 00 60 ff callq *0xffffffffff600008   
0000000000010330 <__restore_rt>:   
10330:       48 c7 c0 0f 00 00 00    mov $0xf,%rax   
10337:       0f 05                   syscall
0000000000010330 <__restore_rt>:   
10330: ff 14 25 80 00 60 ff callq *0xffffffffff600080 
10337: 0f 05                   syscall 
7-Byte	Replacement
9-Byte	Replacement	(Phase-1)
0000000000010330 <__restore_rt>:   
10330: ff 14 25 80 00 60 ff callq *0xffffffffff600080 
10337: eb f7 jmp 0x10330
9-Byte	Replacement	(Phase-2)
Figure 2.4: Examples of binary replacement.
this will cause a jump into the last two bytes of our call instruction, which are
always “0x60 0xff”. These two bytes cause an invalid opcode trap into the
X-Kernel (PV) or X-LibOS (HV). To provide binary level equivalence, we add
a special trap handler in the X-Kernel (only in the case of PV) and X-LibOS to
fix the trap by moving the instruction pointer backward to the beginning of the
call instruction. We have only seen this triggered during the boot time of some
operating systems.
9-byte replacements are performed in two phases, each one of them gener-
ates results equivalent to the original binary. Since the mov instruction takes 7
bytes, we replace it directly with a call into the syscall handler. We can leave the
original syscall instruction unchanged, just in case the program jumps directly
to it. But we further optimize it with a jump into the previous call instruc-
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tion. The syscall handler in X-LibOS will check if the instruction on the return
address is either a syscall or a specific jmp to the call instruction again. If it
is, the syscall handler modifies the return address to skip this instruction.
Our online binary replacement solution only handles the case when the
syscall instruction immediately follows a mov instruction. For more com-
plicated cases, it is possible to inject some code into the binary and re-direct a
bigger chunk of code. We also provide a tool to do it offline. For most standard
libraries such as glibc, the default system call wrappers typically use the pat-
tern illustrated in Figure 2.4. So our current solution is sufficient for optimizing
most system call wrappers on the critical path.
2.4.4 Lightweight Bootstrapping of Docker Images
X-Containers do not have a VM disk image and do not go through the same
bootstrapping phase that a VM does. To bootstrap an X-Container, the X-Kernel
loads an X-LibOS with a special bootloader into memory and jumps to the entry
point of the X-LibOS directly. The bootloader initializes virtual devices, includ-
ing setting IP addresses, and then spawns the process in the container without
running any unnecessary services. The first process in the container can fork
additional processes if necessary. In addition, HV X-LibOS can be also loaded
by GRUB [8] with the special bootloader without the help of underlying hyper-
visors. This approach makes X-Containers smaller than a typical VM and faster
to boot. For example, we are able to spawn a new Ubuntu-16 X-Container with
a single bash process within three seconds, with a memory size of 64MB.
Because X-Containers support binary level compatibility, we can run any ex-
isting Docker image without modification. We connect our X-Container archi-
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Figure 2.5: Software stacks used in the evaluation. A dashed box indicates a
Docker container or X-Container. A solid line indicates an isolation boundary
between privilege levels. A dotted line indicates a library interface.
tecture to the Docker platform with a Docker Wrapper. An unmodified Docker
engine running in the Host X-Container is used to pull and build Docker im-
ages. We use devicemapper as the storage driver, which stores different lay-
ers of Docker images as thin-provisioned copy-on-write snapshot devices. The
Docker Wrapper then retrieves the meta-data from Docker, creates the thin block
device and connects it to a new X-Container. The processes in the container are
then spawned with a dedicated X-LibOS.
2.5 Evaluation
In this section we address the following questions:
• What is the performance overhead of X-Containers, and how does it com-
pare to native Docker both on bare metal and in the cloud?
• How does the performance of X-Containers compare to other LibOS de-
signs?
• How does the scalability of X-Containers compare to native Docker Con-
tainers?
• How can kernel customization benefit performance?
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2.5.1 Experiment Setup
We conducted experiments on both bare-metal machines and on VMs in public
clouds. For bare-metal experiments, we used four Dell PowerEdge R720 servers
(two 2.9 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2690 CPUs, 16 cores, 32 threads, 96GB memory, 4TB
disk), connected to one 10Gbit switch. For the cloud environment, we ran ex-
periments in four VMs in the Amazon EC2 North Virginia region (m3.xlarge
instances, 2 CPU cores, 4 threads, 15GB memory, and 2×40GB SSD storage).
As a baseline we ran a Docker container platform both on bare-
metal and in an Amazon HV machine. We call these two configura-
tions Docker/native/bare and Docker/native/cloud respectively. We
contrasted their performance against Docker containers running in indi-
vidual Xen HV and PV Domain-U VMs and against X-Containers. This
led to six additional configurations: Docker/HV/bare, Docker/PV/bare,
X-Container/HV/bare, X-Container/PV/bare, X-Container/HV/cloud,
and X-Container/PV/cloud. Figure 2.5 illustrates the various software
stacks. Note that of these eight configurations, three run in the cloud and five
on bare-metal.
The host (either a physical machine or an Amazon EC2 instance) running
native Docker had Ubuntu 16.04-LTS installed with Docker engine 17.03.0-ce
and Linux kernel 4.4.44. The host running Xen VMs had CentOS-6 installed in
Domain-0, and Ubuntu 16.04-LTS in Domain-Us with Docker engine 17.03.0-ce,
Linux kernel 4.4.44, and Xen 4.2. The host running X-Containers used X-LibOS
based on Linux kernel 4.4.44, and CentOS-6 as the Host X-Container. Docker
containers used the default NUMA-aware Linux scheduler, with IRQ-balance
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service turned on. The Domain-0 and Host X-Container were configured with
dedicated CPU cores, and we manually balanced IRQ to different cores. Other
VMs or X-Containers were evenly distributed to other CPU cores according to
the NUMA placement.
For each set of experiments, the same Docker image was used. The Docker
engines were all configured with device-mapper storage drivers. When run-
ning network benchmarks that involved a client or a server, a separate machine
or VM was used.
Because applications running in X-Containers have full control over X-
LibOS, they can disable Symmetric Multiprocessing (SMP) and multi-core sup-
port when there is only a single thread busy. This optimization can improve
performance significantly in many cases, eliminating concurrency management
and TLB shoot-down. Applications running in Docker containers cannot do this
kind of optimization because it requires root privilege. In the micro- and macro-
benchmarks that follow, we performed both single-process and multi-process
tests. We disabled SMP support in X-LibOS for single-process cases.
For most experiments we report the average of five runs and also show stan-
dard deviation.
2.5.2 Microbenchmarks
We evaluated the performance of X-Containers with a set of microbenchmarks.
We started with an Ubuntu16 Docker image, and ran UnixBench and iperf
in it. The Execl benchmark measures the speed of the exec system call, which
overlays a new binary on the current process. The File Copy benchmarks test
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Figure 2.6: Relative performance of microbenchmarks.
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the throughput of copying files with different buffer sizes. The Pipe Throughput
benchmark measures the throughput of reading and writing in a pipe. The Pipe-
based Context Switching benchmark tests the speed of two processes communi-
cating with a pipe. The Process Creation benchmark measures the performance of
spawning new processes with the fork system call. The System Call benchmark
tests the speed of issuing a series of system calls including dup, close, getpid,
getuid, and umask. Finally, the iperf benchmark tests the performance of TCP
transfer. For concurrent tests, we ran 4 copies in bare-metal experiments, and 2
copies in Amazon EC2 experiments since the EC2 instance had only two CPU
cores.
Figure 2.6 shows the relative performance normalized according to
Docker/Native (higher is better). X-Containers have significantly higher
system call throughput because we turned system calls into lightweight func-
tion calls. For single-process benchmarks we optimized X-LibOS by disabling
SMP support, and as a result X-Containers significantly outperform Docker.
X-Container/PV had significant overheads compared to Docker/Native in
process creation and context switching, especially in virtualized environments
such as Amazon EC2. This is because process creation and context switches
involves many page table operations, which must be done in the X-Kernel.
X-Container/HV removes this overhead and achieved better performance
than both Docker/native and Docker/HV/bare. (Docker/HV/bare
achieves better performance than Docker/native/bare in file copy bench-
marks because there is an extra layer of disk caching.)
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2.5.3 Macrobenchmarks
We evaluated the performance of X-Containers with two macrobenchmarks:
the NGINX web server and kernel compilation. For the NGINX server, we
ran Docker image NGINX:1.11 on all platforms. We used the wrk bench-
mark to test the throughput of the NGINX server with both single and mul-
tiple worker processes. The wrk client started 10 threads and 100 connections
for each worker process in the NGINX server. On bare-metal machines, Docker
containers and X-Containers used a bridged network and can be connected to
clients directly. On Amazon EC2, they used a private network with port for-
warding. Note that X-Container/HV/cloud took over the whole HVM in
EC2, so it got access to the network without port forwarding. For kernel compi-
lation tests, we used the Ubuntu-16.04 Docker image and installed compilation
tools in it. We compiled the latest 4.10 Linux kernel with the “tiny” configura-
tion. Concurrent tests are performed by running 4 parallel jobs in bare-metal
experiments and 2 parallel jobs in Amazon EC2 experiments.
Figure 2.7 shows the NGINX web server throughput measured on
bare-metal machines and Amazon EC2. X-Containers consistently outper-
formed Docker containers inside Xen VMs due to kernel customization
and reduced system call overhead. When running a single worker pro-
cess, X-Container/PV/bare and X-Container/HV/bare were further
optimized by disabling SMP support and achieved 5% and 23% higher
throughput than Docker/native/bare containers respectively. When run-
ning concurrent worker processes on bare-metal, the performance of X-
Containers was comparable to Docker/native/bare containers. In Ama-
zon EC2, X-Containers/HV/cloud achieved 69% to 78% higher through-
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Figure 2.7: NGINX web server throughput.
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Figure 2.8: Kernel compilation time. (Lower is better.)
put than Docker/native/cloud since it took over the whole HVM
and ran without port forwarding. Due to context switch overhead,
X-Containers/PV/cloud had a 20% performance loss in concurrent tests
compared to Docker/native/cloud. This result shows that for network I/O
intensive workloads, X-Containers perform better than VMs and in many cases
even better than native Docker containers.
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Figure 2.8 shows the kernel compilation time on bare-metal machines and
Amazon EC2 instances. Lower is better. Similar to NGINX experiments, single-
process X-Containers on bare-metal machines performed significantly better
than Docker containers running natively or in VMs. We did not see a similar
improvement in Amazon EC2, which we suspect is due to another layer of I/O
scheduling. PV X-Containers performance suffered a bit because of the high
overhead of page table management in paravirtualized environments, slowing
down operations such as fork and exec. This result shows that, for CPU inten-
sive workloads, the performance benefit we can get from lighter-weight system
calls is limited, but a performance boost is still possible by kernel customiza-
tion.
2.5.4 Comparing X-Containers to Unikernel and Graphene
We compared X-Containers to Graphene and Unikernel. We ran the wrk bench-
mark with NGINX webserver, PHP, and MySQL database on bare-metal ma-
chines. Graphene ran on Linux with Ubuntu-16.04, and was compiled with-
out the security isolation module (which should improve its performance). For
Unikernel, we used Rumprun [22] because it can run those applications with
minor patches (running with MirageOS [89] requires rewriting the entire appli-
cation with OCaml). Unikernel does not support running in Xen HV, so we only
tested it with PV mode.
Figure 2.9a compares the throughput of NGINX webserver serving static
webpages with a single worker process. As there is only one NGINX
server process running, we optimized X-Containers by disabling SMP. X-
Containers achieved throughput comparable to Unikernel, and over twice that
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Figure 2.9: Performance comparison to Unikernel and Graphene (G: Graphene;
U: Unikernel; X-PV: X-Container PV; X-HV: X-Container HV; SX-PV: Separated
X-Container PV; SX-HV: Separated X-Container HV).
of Graphene.
Figure 2.9b shows throughput for an NGINX webserver and a PHP CGI
server. Graphene does not support PHP CGI server, so we only compared
to Unikernel. Because Unikernel cannot run multiple processes, we ran two
Unikernel VMs connected with a virtual network, and compared it to a similar
setup with two X-Containers. We found that the throughput was very close be-
cause the major bottleneck is due to network I/O. In contrast, an X-Container
can run a Docker image with an NGINX process and a PHP process connected
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with a local socket. This significantly helps performance: X-Container through-
put was about five times that of the Unikernel setup.
Figure 2.9c shows a case of running 4 worker processes of a single NG-
INX webserver. This is not supported by Unikernel, so we only compared to
Graphene. In this case, X-Container outperformed Graphene by more than 50%.
The performance of Graphene was limited because in Graphene multiple pro-
cesses use IPC calls to coordinate access to a shared POSIX library, which causes
significant overhead.
We evaluated the scenario illustrated in Section 2.2.2, where two PHP CGI
servers are connected to MySQL databases. We enabled the built-in webserver
of PHP, and used the wrk client to access a page that issued requests to the
database (with equal probability for read and write). As shown in Figure 2.2,
the PHP servers can either share the database or have separate ones. Graphene
does not support PHP CGI server, so we only compared to Unikernel. Fig-
ure 2.9d shows the total throughput of two PHP servers with different configu-
rations. All VMs were running single process with one CPU core. With 3-VM
and 4-VM configurations, X-Containers outperformed Unikernel by more than
40%. We believe this is because the Linux kernel is better optimized than the
Rumprun kernel. Further, X-Container supports running PHP and MySQL in a
single container, which is not possible for Unikernel. This convenience also sig-
nificantly helps performance: X-Container throughput was about three times
that of the Unikernel setup.
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Figure 2.10: Scalability.
2.5.5 Scalability Evaluations
We evaluated the scalability of the X-Container architecture by running up to
400 containers on one physical machine. For this experiment we used an NG-
INX server with a PHP-FPM engine. We used the webdevops/PHP-NGINX
Docker image and configured NGINX and PHP-FPM with a single worker pro-
cess. We ran the wrk benchmark to measure the total throughput of all contain-
ers. Each container has a dedicated wrk thread with 5 concurrent connections—
thus the total number of wrk threads and concurrent connections increases lin-
early with the number of containers.
Each X-Container was configured with 1 virtual CPU and 128MB memory,
with X-LibOS optimized by disabling SMP support.1 For Docker/HV/bare
and Docker/PV/bare, each Xen VM was assigned 1 virtual CPU and 512MB
memory (512MB is the recommended minimum size for Ubuntu-16 OS). How-
1X-Containers also work with 64MB memory, but for this experiment 128MB memory size is
sufficiently small to boot 400 X-Containers.
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ever, because the physical machine only has 96GB memory, we had to change
the memory size of the VMs to 256MB when starting more than 200 VMs. We
found that the VMs could still boot but the network stacks started dropping
packets. We were not able to boot more than 250 PV instances or more than 200
HV instances correctly on Xen.
Figure 2.10 shows the aggregated throughput of all bare-metal configura-
tions. We can see that Docker/native/bare containers achieved higher
throughput for small numbers of containers. This is because context switching
between Docker containers is cheaper than between X-Containers and between
Xen VMs. However, as the number of containers increased, the performance
of Docker containers dropped faster. This is because each NGINX+PHP con-
tainer ran 4 processes: with N containers, the Linux kernel running Docker con-
tainers was scheduling 4N processes, while X-Kernel was scheduling N virtual
CPUs, each running 4 processes. This hierarchical scheduling turned out to be
a more scalable way of scheduling many containers together, and with N = 400
X-Container/PV/bare outperformed Docker/native/bare by 18%.
2.5.6 Performance Benefits of Kernel Customization
X-Container enables application containers that require customized kernel
modules. For example, X-Containers can use software RDMA (both Soft-iwarp
and Soft-ROCE) applications. In Docker environments such modules require
root privilege and exposes the host network to the container directly, raising
security concerns.
In this section we present a case study of kernel customization in X-
Containers that illustrates a performance benefit. We tested a scenario with
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Figure 2.11: Kernel-level load balancing.
three NGINX web servers and a load balancer. The NGINX web servers are each
configured to use one worker process. Docker platforms typically use a user-
level load balancer such as HAProxy. HAProxy is a single threaded, event-driver
proxy server widely deployed in production systems. X-Containers supports
HAProxy, but can also use kernel-level load balancing solutions such as IPVS
(IP Virtual Server). IPVS requires inserting new kernel modules and changing
iptable and ARP table rules, which is not possible in Docker containers without
root privilege and access to the host network.
In this experiment, we used the HAProxy:1.7.5 Docker image. The load
balancer and NGINX servers were running on the same physical machine. We
configured each X-Container with a single virtual CPU, with SMP supported
turned off in X-LibOS for optimized performance. We used the wrk workload
generator and measured total throughput.
Figure 2.11 compares various configurations. The X-Container platform with
HAProxy achieved twice the throughput of the Docker container platform. With
IPVS kernel level load balancing using NAT mode, X-Containers further im-
prove throughput by 12%. In this case the load balancer was the bottleneck
because it served as both web front-end and NAT server. IPVS supports an-
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other load balancing mode called “direct routing.” With direct routing, the load
balancer only needs to forward requests to backend servers while responses
from backend servers are routed directly to clients. This requires changing ipt-
able rules and inserting kernel modules both in the load balancer and NGINX
servers. With direct routing mode, the bottleneck shifted to the NGINX servers,
and total throughput improved by another factor of 1.5.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we demonstrated how we can use an exokernel architecture to
run unmodified container distributions efficiently and securely, both on bare
metal and in the cloud. One important insight is that the Linux kernel makes
an excellent Library OS when modified to run at the same privilege level as the
container. Linux is highly optimized and already supports customization. Sys-
tem calls can be dynamically rewritten into function calls to reduce unnecessary
abstraction overheads.
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CHAPTER 3
TOWARDS SECURE, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFICIENT IAAS PLATFORM:
LIBRARY CLOUD
3.1 Introduction
Existing IaaS cloud platforms lack sufficient support for flexibility and effi-
ciency, violating a basic systems design principle as formulated by Butler Lamp-
son: Don’t Hide Power [85], or, in other words, do not hide desirable interfaces.
Cloud providers hide many powerful management interfaces, including VM
placement and migration, CPU capping, memory ballooning, page sharing,
I/O throttling, and network routing. Without such interfaces, applications are
severely limited in the ways they can optimally configure resources or respond
to dynamically shifting workloads.
In this chapter, we apply the exokernel approach to separate protection and
management in IaaS platforms, and introduce the Library Cloud abstraction. In
a Library Cloud, cloud providers are only needed to provide basic resources for
computation, storage, and networking. A Library Cloud implements an entire
cloud stack on top of these resources, as it were, in user space. Moreover, these
resources can be allocated at multiple cloud providers.
Like a private IaaS cloud, a Library Cloud supports traditional cloud ser-
vices for allocating virtual machines. But a Library Cloud also provides all the
administrative APIs that are not available to users of public cloud providers.
Because a Library Cloud supports management operations such as user-level
migration and memory consolidation, it enables application solutions not eas-
ily achieved with disjoint cloud providers or even federated clouds based on
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standard interfaces. Two examples of this are management of geographically
shifting workloads and transparent consolidation of virtual machine resources.
We describe and evaluate these examples in this chapter.
We built a prototype Library Cloud that we call the Supercloud. Building
the Supercloud, we had to overcome various challenges related to computa-
tion, storage, networking, and management. Although some cloud providers
such as Amazon allow customers to rent dedicated physical servers, most cloud
providers do not expose physical resources directly. Supercloud leverages
nested virtualization technology [122], eliminating the need for VM manage-
ment support from underlying providers. Xen-Blanket unifies machine virtu-
alization on different platforms and provides the same interfaces that are sup-
ported in the Xen hypervisor.
We designed and implemented a new distributed storage system optimized
for wide-area cross-provider VM migration. It decouples providing strong con-
sistency from update propagation, minimizing overhead and optimizing per-
formance. VMs run in a high performance Software-Defined Network (SDN)
built with Open-vSwitch and VXLAN tunnels crossing cloud boundaries. We
also designed and evaluated various solutions to deal with migrating services
that use public IP addresses. The Supercloud runs the OpenStack platform and
appears to users as a single private OpenStack cloud.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We propose a Library Cloud abstraction for user-level resource manage-
ment.
• We show how nested-virtualization can be leveraged to handle hetero-
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geneity and implement a Library Cloud without the support of underly-
ing cloud providers.
• We propose storage and networking solutions for supporting efficient VM
migration in a Library Cloud, and show how they can be implemented
efficiently.
• We evaluate a prototype of the Library Cloud abstraction—the Super-
cloud.
• We demonstrate how applications can benefit from the Library Cloud us-
ing case studies of geographically shifting workloads and virtual machine
consolidation.
3.2 Towards the Library Cloud
3.2.1 The Library Cloud Abstraction
A Library OS [57, 100, 89] is an application of the end-to-end principle [104]
to operating systems. A traditional monolithic OS kernel packs many func-
tions into kernel space and presents complex high level abstractions to user
programs such as a hierarchical multi-user file system and network sockets. Al-
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though such high-level abstractions simplify development of applications, they
also limit customization and optimization as they force applications to build on
top of modules designed with specific requirements in mind. The Library OS
concept, in conjunction with an Exokernel, addresses this problem. The Exok-
ernel is a tiny kernel that implements only resource multiplexing and security
isolation; other traditional OS functionalities are implemented in Library OSs
specialized for different applications. This approach gives applications more
flexibility to choose a proper abstraction for optimal performance and security.
The Library Cloud abstraction introduced in this chapter is conceptually
similar to a Library OS: users and applications get control over a full cloud soft-
ware stack and can customize it for their own purposes; the underlying cloud
providers only need to provide basic resource multiplexing and isolation. The
Library Cloud abstraction further extends the notion of Library OS: a single Li-
brary Cloud can span across multiple cloud providers. Figure 3.1 compares the
Library OS and Library Cloud designs.
Applications running in a Library Cloud interact using a Library Cloud API
that can be much richer than a typical cloud API. A Library Cloud API not
only supports typical Cloud API methods such as creating VMs and manag-
ing networks, but also enables methods that are usually only available to cloud
providers, such as live VM migration, consolidation, checkpointing, and dy-
namic scaling. Section 3.3 presents an example of the Library Cloud API. Fig-
ure 3.2 illustrates the difference between traditional clouds and Library Clouds.
A Library Cloud can be implemented on top of any existing cloud API.
We are expecting that Cloud APIs will emerge with lower abstractions so that
unnecessary abstraction layers can be removed. For example, HIL [71] is an
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Exokernel-like layer for data centers that exposes physical resources directly to
different cloud users.
3.2.2 Innovations Enabled by the Library Cloud
A Library Cloud abstraction supports innovations that are hard to realize in
current cloud infrastructures. In this section we will describe use cases that
benefit from a Library Cloud like the Supercloud.
Follow the Sun
For a service that has global users in different timezones, it would be ideal if
it could “follow the sun,” that is, continuously shifting to a location where the
majority of users experience the lowest possible latency. This is a challenging
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task even for distributed applications that can migrate by adding and removing
nodes, not to mention legacy applications that cannot be easily scaled dynami-
cally.
Distributed applications typically adopt a distributed consensus or trans-
action protocol in order to support data replication, distributed locking, dis-
tributed transactions, and so on. These protocols are designed to be fault-
tolerant. However, adding and removing nodes while tolerating failure is a fun-
damental and challenging problem—it requires changing the “membership” of
the system, thus subsequent requests following the membership change must be
processed with a different configuration. In addition to the complexity of reach-
ing agreement on configuration, adding and removing nodes triggers compli-
cated internal state transfer and synchronization protocols, and membership
reconfiguration is not transparent to clients. As a result, tolerating failure while
providing good performance during reconfiguration is non-trivial.
Because membership reconfiguration is generally considered a rare event,
applications use ad hoc mechanisms to achieve it with unpredictable perfor-
mance. For example, MongoDB does not allow changing the sharding key on
the fly, and the whole database must be exported and then imported again to
change key distribution. As another example, re-configuring a cluster running
an old version of ZooKeeper (without the new dynamic reconfiguration feature)
requires a “rolling restart”—a procedure whereby servers are shutdown and
restarted in a particular order so that any quorum of currently running servers
includes at least one server with the latest state [109]. If not performed correctly,
one server with outdated state might be elected as the new leader and the whole
cluster might enter an inconsistent state. While ZooKeeper recently added sup-
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port for dynamic reconfiguration, it is inefficient for geographic migration (see
Section 3.4.2). A key-value store such as Cassandra can easily add and remove
a node and adjust token distribution, but doing these for geographic server mi-
gration triggers unnecessary data replication and load re-balancing, and can
affect service availability if a failure occurs at the same time (see Section 3.4.2).
In order to “follow the sun”, applications must be migrated several times
a day, and, as we have discussed, implementing migration by adding and re-
moving nodes is suboptimal. An alternative approach is to use live VM mi-
gration since it can be performed transparently to the application and even to
clients. For example, if live VM migration were supported, we can migrate
the ZooKeeper leader and servers to locations where the leader and a major-
ity of servers are geographically close to most active users, without the need of
changing a single line of source code in ZooKeeper. Often this only involves mi-
grating the leader: If the majority of clients reside in two different regions like
the US and Asia, and there are 2 f + 1 servers, including one leader, then with
f servers running in one location, the US, and f servers running in another,
Asia, only the leader needs to migrate back and forth once a day. Live migrat-
ing a VM comprises multiple phases [51]. First, the image is copied while the
VM is still running at the old location. Pages that are written by the running
VM after they have been copied have to be copied again, and thus this phase
might require multiple rounds of copying. When the number of dirty pages is
below some minimum, the VM is suspended for a short period of time to finish
copying the remaining state. After this, the VM at the new location resumes
execution. The application downtime corresponds to this relatively short final
copying phase plus the time required for the network layer to adjust routing
paths for the migrated VM. The downtime due to live migration of a VM be-
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tween the U.S. and Asia is less than one second, while the total migration time
for 1GB memory (which proceeds in the background) is about 100 seconds. The
downtime is small enough such that TCP connections do not break nor cause
broken sessions or leader re-election.
Dynamic Resource Scheduling
VMware vSphere Distributed Resource Scheduling (DRS) redistributes, invisi-
ble to applications, virtual machines among a pool of hardware servers to opti-
mize utilization, and it is an important technique to meet business goals. Public
clouds provide services such as Amazon Auto Scaling [1] to dynamically add
and remove nodes for distributed applications. But these services require users
to reconfigure their application on the fly to deal with a changing number of
VMs. The Supercloud supports a new paradigm for resource scaling that we
call Supercloud Dynamic Resource Scheduling (SDRS). SDRS opens up new op-
portunities to minimize cost without compromising application performance or
changing application configurations.
SDRS leverages hypervisor-level mechanisms enabled by the Supercloud
such as VM migration, CPU capping [107], memory ballooning [119], page shar-
ing [68], and I/O throttling [81] to share resources efficiently, while ensuring
that different VMs do not interfere with each other. When load increases, nested
VMs are migrated to separate provider VMs with more available resources in or-
der to maintain application performance. This is analogous to a cloud provider
consolidating VMs on a smaller number of physical machines and migrating
VMs to an increased number of physical machines when load increases. When
application load is low, nested VMs can be consolidated on a single provider
VM, greatly reducing cost. Section 3.4.3 evaluates this using the TPC-W bench-
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mark.
Smart Spot Instances
Amazon EC2 provides a spot market, offering cheap VMs in underused avail-
ability zones. Microsoft Azure has a similar offering. Such instances are difficult
to use effectively in practice: prices of spot market instances change rapidly and
can even significantly exceed on-demand VM instances. More problematically,
Amazon EC2 reserves the right to terminate instances when an availability zone
is no longer underutilized. We have designed and built Smart Spot Instances [76],
achieving both low cost and high availability by migrating VMs rapidly to the
cheapest and most available locations. The technique takes into account the
network charge for transferring VM images across availability zones. In our ex-
perience, we are able to provide a long-running smart VM instances at approx-
imately a third of the price of a normal instance. A similar idea was developed
in SpotCheck [106]. The Supercloud makes it easy to develop such innovations
and, going beyond SpotCheck, generalizes to multiple cloud providers.
3.3 The Supercloud: A Library Cloud Implementation
The Supercloud is an instance of a Library Cloud that is designed to operate
without any specific support from underlying cloud providers. It embodies con-
trol of compute, networking, storage, and management that can be customized
by users (Figure 3.2). Importantly, a Supercloud can span multiple availabil-
ity zones of the same provider as well as availability zones of multiple cloud
providers and private clusters (see Figure 3.3). To accomplish this, there are two
layers of hardware virtualization. The bottom layer, called first-layer, is the in-
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Figure 3.3: Example deployment of the Supercloud.
frastructure managed by a Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud provider such
as Amazon EC2 or Rackspace, or managed privately. It provides VMs, cloud
storage, and networking. Another layer of virtualization on top of this, called
second-layer, is the IaaS infrastructure managed by the Supercloud. It leverages
resources from the first-layer and provides a single uniform virtual cloud inter-
face. Importantly, the second-layer is completely controlled by users.
In case of compute resources, the first-layer has a hypervisor managed by
the underlying cloud provider and a collection of hardware virtual machines
(HVMs). We refer to these as first-layer hypervisors and first-layer VMs.
The second layer, exposed to Supercloud users, is similarly separated into
a hypervisor and some number of guest VMs that we call the second-layer hy-
pervisor and VMs1. We use Xen-Blanket [122] for the second-layer hypervisor.
Xen-Blanket provides a consistent Xen-based para-virtualized (PV) interface. In
Xen, one VM is called Domain-0 (aka Dom0) and manages the other VMs, called
Domain-Us (aka DomUs). A second-layer Dom0 multiplexes resources such as
I/O amongst the DomUs.
1User VMs, user VM instances, second-layer VMs, and second-layer DomU VMs are used
interchangeably.
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We use OpenStack [16] to manage user VMs and provide the administrative
OpenStack API as the Library Cloud API to existing applications. In particular, a
XenServer runs within the second-layer Dom0 and allows OpenStack to manage
all second-layer DomU VMs.
A common practice in VM migration is using shared storage to serve VM
images, so that a VM migration only needs to transfer the memory. This is es-
sential to good performance because migrating a VM with the disk image takes
a long time. XenServer offers two options for sharing storage: an NFS-based
solution and an iSCSI-based solution. Both these approaches use a centralized
storage repository. While simple, this can lead to significant latencies, low band-
width, and high Internet cost for VMs that access the disk through a wide area
network when migrated to another region or cloud. Previous works have pro-
posed different mechanisms and optimization for wide-area VM migration with
disk images [45, 90, 96]. However, migrating the whole image file incurs signif-
icant Internet traffic, which is typically charged by cloud providers. To support
efficient VM migration in the wide area network, we developed a geo-replicated
image file storage that seeks a good balance between performance and cost.
To provide the illusion of a single virtual cloud, the control services (includ-
ing XenServer and OpenStack) and user VMs need to communicate in a consis-
tent manner no matter where the end-point VMs reside. A migrated user VM
expects its IP address to remain unchanged. To accomplish this, the Supercloud
network layer is built using a Software-Defined Network (SDN) overlay based
on Open vSwitch, VXLAN tunnels, and the Frenetic SDN controller [59]. Such
an overlay network gives control over routing for the second-layer and enables
compatibility with heterogeneous first-layer networks.
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We support all major hypervisors including Xen, KVM, Hyper-V, and
VMware, so a Supercloud instance can span all major cloud providers includ-
ing Amazon EC2, Rackspace, Windows Azure, Google Compute Engine, and
VMware vCloud Air.
The Supercloud, like any other IaaS cloud, provides three types of resources:
computing, networking, and storage. Below we present each one in more detail.
3.3.1 Computing
Nested Virtualization
Nested virtualization is essential in the Supercloud in order to provide a
uniform interface and support privileged operations such as live VM migra-
tion. However, nested virtualization is not natively supported by most cloud
providers. Solutions that require special support in the first-layer hypervisor
such as the Turtles project [38] cannot be run in public clouds. We use Xen-
Blanket [122], a nested virtualized Xen hypervisor that runs on various widely
supported hardware virtualized VMs (HVMs) and provides a para-virtualized
(PV) interface to second-layer VMs.
In a full virtualized environment, the underlying hypervisor is completely
transparent to the system running in the VM. When virtual devices are emu-
lated, a Xen hypervisor can run without modification in an HVM. However,
emulated devices have poor performance. Thus, clouds typically adopt para-
virtualized (PV) devices for HVM instances, e.g., PV-on-HVM devices on Xen,
virtio devices on KVM, and enlightened I/O devices on Hyper-V. In this
model, a device driver in the VM works together with the underlying hypervi-
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sor to improve I/O performance. This solution breaks transparency, and brings
new challenges when we want to run Xen as a second-layer hypervisor:
• A standard PV device driver cannot work properly because a second-layer
Domain-0 (Dom0) is no longer running in the Ring-0 privileged domain;
• The notion of a “physical address” in a Xen-based VM no longer matches
the “machine address” in the HVM.
Xen-Blanket opens new interfaces to enable communication between a PV
device driver in the second-layer Dom0 and the first-layer hypervisor, and
leverages different blanket drivers to deal with diverse hypervisors. It then
multiplexes these PV devices and provides a consistent Xen device interface.
Hence the underlying infrastructure becomes transparent to the second-layer
user VMs. The bulk of the effort in enabling Xen-Blanket in a cloud infrastruc-
ture is porting the blanket driver. Once enabled, second-layer user VMs can run
on Xen-Blanket without any modification.
The performance overhead of Xen-Blanket has been thoroughly evalu-
ated [122]. To summarize, Xen-Blanket is able to match native network I/O per-
formance and incur about 12% overhead for disk I/O performance compared to
a native para-virtualized instance. We also tested a sysbench CPU benchmark,
which shows that the completion time difference between first and second layer
VMs is within 10%.
Handling Heterogeneity
Different underlying CPUs might have different capabilities, preventing a VM
from working properly after being migrated. We can record the CPU features
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exposed to a second-layer VM when it is created, and only migrate it to a first-
layer VM that support compatible CPU features. However, this places a limit
on the placement of the VM.
For applications that require more flexibility on VM placement, we can ex-
pose a subset of CPU features that are common in CPUs, which is sufficient for
supporting most applications. This requires a solution to control which CPU
feature we want to expose. Hardware solutions such as Intel VT FlexMigra-
tion and AMD-V Extended Migration trigger a fault when guest VMs execute
a CPUID instruction, thus providing the virtual machine monitor (VMM) an
opportunity to intercept this instruction and report a consistent set of CPU fea-
tures to the VMs. Unfortunately, CPUID faulting is not virtualized. As a result,
a second-layer hypervisor running in an HVM loses the ability to intercept the
CPUID instruction.
Fortunately, because all second-layer VMs running on top of Xen-Blanket
are para-virtualized, in most cases they will invoke the pv cpuid hook in the
hypervisor instead of executing the CPUID instruction directly. So we modi-
fied the pv cpuid hook in Xen-Blanket to only expose a desired subset of CPU
flags. Applications running in second-layer VMs will see a set of consistent
CPU flags when checking the Linux /proc interface. Note that this solution does
not prevent user VMs from running the CPUID instruction directly. Processor
vendors may eventually support virtualized CPUID faulting so that a second-
layer hypervisor could intercept the instruction and control CPU flags exposed
to second-layer VMs.
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3.3.2 Storage
Consistency and Data Propagation
Geo-replicated storage solutions sometimes adopt a weaker consistency model,
such as eventual consistency, in which applications reading different replicas may
see stale results. This is not suitable for an image storage on which a migrated
VM expects up-to-date data. Using a strongly consistent geo-replicated storage
requires synchronous data propagation, resulting in low write throughput. A
key observation is that a running application typically does not require all data
in the image. Our storage system thus decouples consistency from data propa-
gation.
As shown in Figure 3.4, the storage service consists of two layers: a data view
layer provides a required consistency guarantee, and a data store layer stores
and propagates data. Images are divided into blocks with a constant size (4KB).
The global meta-data in the data view layer includes a version number for each
block. When a VM is reading a block, the version number is compared to the
version number in the local meta-data in the local data store. If the latest version
of the block is available locally, data is returned immediately. Otherwise, the
data store checks the location of the block in the global meta-data and fetches
the data remotely. Updating a block increases its version number by one, and
the updated global meta-data is then propagated to other replicas.
The consistency model seen by applications is completely determined by
the data view layer. Since we only have global meta-data in this layer, it is
relatively cheap to implement strong consistency. Section 3.3.2 describes how
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we can further optimize the synchronization of global meta-data by relaxing the
consistency model. Since the data store layer is decoupled, data propagation
can be optimized separately without concern about consistency.
Our current design optimizes performance and minimizes traffic cost. The
Back-End Storage can tolerate failures within a single cloud. However, after
several migrations the image may have the latest version of blocks scattered in
different clouds, and a cloud-level failure before an updated block is propagated
may affect the availability of the whole image. If an image is really critical and
would like to tolerate cloud failures, it is possible to pass a hint to the prop-
agation manager so that each write is synchronously propagated to different
clouds, at significant cost to application performance.
Global Meta-Data Propagation
Due to the long latency in the wide area network, meta-data transfer affects
application performance significantly if this propagation is in the read/write
critical path. We make two key observations:
• If an image file is open for writing, it can only be accessed by a single VM.
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This happens when the image is private to a VM.
• If an image file is shared by multiple VMs, it is read-only. This happens
when the image is a snapshot or a base image file.
These observations indicate that, although a migrated VM is expecting strong
consistency from the image storage, multiple replicas of the same image file do
not need to be identical all the time. It suffices to provide VMs with a “close-
to-open” consistency: after a file is closed, reads after subsequent opens will
see the latest version. We remove the global meta-data propagation from the
read/write critical path by committing the meta-data update locally, and only
flushing the global meta-data to a centralized controller when closing the im-
age file. Subsequent opens of the file need to sync the global meta-data with
the controller first. Note that the controller is involved only when opening or
closing the image file.
Data Propagation Policies
By decoupling the data view and data store layer, a VM can see a consistent disk
image no matter where it is migrated. However, fetching each block on-demand
through the wide area network significantly degrades read performance. It is
useful to proactively propagate a block before migration if we can predict that
it is going to be accessed in another place. Intuitively, a block that is read fre-
quently and updated rarely should be aggressively propagated. On the other
hand, propagating a block that is updated frequently is a waste of network re-
sources. Because Internet traffic is typically charged to the user, we need to be
careful about proactive propagation.
The data store layer monitors the access pattern of the VM and selectively
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propagates those blocks that are most likely to be accessed after migration and
least likely to be updated after propagation. To this end, we maintain a prior-
ity queue of updated blocks for each image file. The priority of each block is
updated on each read or write. We use the read/write ratio F = fr/ fw to calcu-
late the priority of propagating a block, where fr and fw are the read and write
frequency of a block respectively. When two blocks have the same value of F,
we first propagate the block with a higher read frequency. So the formula of
calculating the propagation priority Pb for a block b is:
Pb =

K · f br / f bw + f br if f br / f bw ≥ S
−1 if f bw = 0 or f br / f bw < S
The value K determines how much we want to favor the read/write ratio. In
our prototype we use K = 1000. The constant S determines the aggressiveness of
the propagation. The lower S is, the more data will be propagated. When f bw = 0,
which means the block has never been updated, or when f br / f bw < S , we set the
priority to −1 to indicate that this block is not to be propagated proactively. In
our current prototype, S is set to 1.
Applications might have different requirements for when to propagate data
updates. Depending on the workload or the trade-off between application per-
formance and traffic cost, the propagation should be tuned separately for each
VM on the fly. Our storage layer provides parameters K and S as tuning knobs
for this purpose. Designing an automatic online tuning policy is left as future
work.
After deciding which block to propagate, the next question is where to prop-
agate the block. Since the Supercloud can be deployed to many places even
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across clouds, propagating each block to all destinations wastes Internet traf-
fic and money. To further optimize data propagation, a transition probability
table is added into the image file’s meta-data, indicating the probability that a
VM is moved from one place to another. Each data block is randomly propa-
gated according to the probability in the transition table, so that the destination
to which the VM is most likely to be migrated will receive most propagated
blocks. In our current prototype, the transition table is provided as a hint by the
user when creating the image file. It is also possible to train the table on the fly
if the VM is migrated many times.
3.3.3 Networking
High-Performance VPN
To enable communication between control services (including XenServer and
OpenStack services) and VMs, we place them into a virtual private network
(VPN). Good performance requires minimizing the number of hops. Existing
VPN solutions such as OpenVPN [17] use a centralized server to forward traffic,
which causes high latency and poor throughput. The tinc VPN [23] implements
an automatic full mesh peer-to-peer routing protocol, minimizing the number
of hops traversed between endpoints. However, we found that tinc imposes
high performance overhead, mostly caused by extra data-copy and kernel/user
mode switching.
To build a high-performance VPN solution for the Supercloud, we use Open
vSwitch [15], VXLAN tunnels, and the Frenetic SDN controller [59]. Open
vSwitch implements data-paths in kernel mode and supports an OpenFlow-
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based control plane. Each virtual switch uses an uplink to connect to the VMs
running on the same first-layer VM and a set of VXLAN tunnels to connect to all
other switches, as illustrated in Figure 3.5. We create a full mesh network here
because we want to always forward packets directly to their destinations. We
use VXLAN over GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) tunnels because this
approach is based on UDP instead of a proprietary protocol, and thus better
supported by different firewalls.
In a hierarchical topology, switches running in a private network cannot set
up VXLAN tunnels directly with other switches outside the network. A gate-
way switch is required to forward packets in this case (see Figure 3.5). The node
running the gateway switch is in more than one network. To implement the
gateway switch, we create one switch for each of the networks, inter-connected
with an in-kernel patch port. Each switch builds full mesh connections with other
switches in its own network as before and treats the patch port as an uplink.
Switches connected in a full mesh form loops. Ordinarily one would run
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a spanning tree protocol, but with a network topology demonstrated in Fig-
ure 3.5, a spanning tree cannot minimize the number of hops for every pair of
nodes. To route packets efficiently, switches in the Supercloud VPN are con-
nected to a centralized SDN controller implemented with Frenetic [59]. The
controller learns the topology of the network by instructing the switches to
send a “spoof packet.” On receiving the spoof packet, switches report to the
controller on which port the packet is received, so that the controller can record
how switches are connected. The controller implements a MAC-learning func-
tionality for each switch. The MAC address, IP address, and location of a VM is
learned when it sends out packets.
ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) packets are forwarded directly to the
destination instead of broadcast. When routing a packet, the controller calcu-
lates the shortest path on the network and installs OpenFlow rules along the
path to enable the communication. This is done only once for each flow and
subsequent data transportation does not need to involve the controller anymore.
Supporting VM Live-Migration
Supporting VM live migration is another challenge. To keep the IP address
of a migrated VM unchanged, the underlying VPN needs to adjust the routing
path and re-direct traffic. However, the adjustment cannot be done immediately
when the migration is triggered, because at this point the VM is still running in
the original location and existing network flows should not be affected.
In order to know at which point the routing path should be adjusted with-
out adding a hook into the hypervisor, before triggering the migration, the con-
troller is notified with the source and destination of the migrated VM. The con-
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troller then injects a preparation rule in the destination switch so that it can get
an immediate report when a packet with the migrated VM’s MAC address is re-
ceived. When migration is finished, the migrated VM will send out an ARP no-
tification. This is captured by the controller so that it knows that the migration
has finished. The controller then updates all switches that have the migrated
VM’s MAC address in the MAC table, avoiding the usual ARP broadcast.
Supporting Public IP Addresses
A public IP address is required to expose a service to the public network. We
currently support addressing a second-layer VM from the public network by
allocating a public IP address to a first-layer VM in the Supercloud network (i.e.,
a public IP front-end), and then applying port forwarding to map certain ports
to the second-layer VM. This solution has good performance because packets
can be routed in the public network to the VM directly.
A challenge arises when this VM is migrated to a different cloud provider.
Without specific support from Internet Service Providers (ISPs) such as any-
cast, mobile IP, or multihoming, traffic sent to the public IP address needs to be
re-directed by the same first-layer VM, no matter where the second-layer VM
currently resides. While this works, it can lead to high latency.
To address this issue, we adopt an idea from Content Distribution Networks
(CDN): instead of giving the same public IP address to clients all over the world,
we give each client the public IP address of a front-end server in a nearby data
center. Taking this extra but short hop, the routing from the front-end to the
second-layer VM is always optimized in the public network, performing much
better for most clients than a centralized public IP solution.
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For applications that do not want to pay the additional cost of the front-end
servers, multiple public IP addresses, and an additional hop, the Supercloud has
its own dynamic DNS service and can update the DNS mapping after migration.
Note that clients might see an out-of-date public IP address before the DNS
cache is expired. For services that use protocols such as HTTP, SOAP, and REST,
we deploy an HTTP redirection service on the original public IP front-end and
respond to clients with an HTTP redirection response.
3.3.4 Management and Scheduling Framework
A Library Cloud includes a resource management platform that manages un-
derlying computation, storage, and network resources and that provides an
easy-to-use Library Cloud API to access them. To this end, we adopted the
widely used OpenStack. OpenStack provides interfaces to manage cloud re-
sources through a web-based OpenStack dashboard, or via the OpenStack API. To
incorporate OpenStack with Xen-Blanket, we run XenServer [24], a server virtu-
alization platform that provides feature-rich APIs to communicate with the Xen
hypervisor.
One technical challenge that we faced was that XenServer requires a direct
installation with an ISO image of the complete software stack, including the Xen
hypervisor and Dom0 operating system (OS), which cannot be easily ported to
different clouds. To overcome this, we use XenServer-core [25], a set of core
components of XenServer that can be installed in a standard CentOS installa-
tion. We ported Xen-Blanket to Xen 4.2.2 and Linux Kernel 3.4.53 in order to
run XenServer-core.
Applications in the Supercloud can make migration decisions by themselves
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and issue migration commands through the OpenStack API. To facilitate the
process of deciding optimal placement, the Supercloud provides a scheduling
framework for the user. Users can customize the scheduling policy for differ-
ent applications by implementing some interfaces. The Supercloud scheduler
periodically evaluates current placement of the application and automatically
adjusts it when a better placement is found.
Suppose the Supercloud is deployed to N different data centers: d1,d2, ...,dN .
We denote a placement plan for an application with k nodes as P = {p1, p2, ..., pk},
where pi is the location of the ith node. Periodically, the Supercloud measures
end-to-end latency between all different data centers and stores the results in
a latency matrix L, where L(i, j) is the round-trip-time (RTT) from di to d j. The
workload of the application is also captured periodically in a workload statistics
report S . S is application-specific, so it should be monitored in the application-
level and passed to the scheduling framework as an opaque handle. Applica-
tions can pack more information into S if needed, such as the current placement,
topology, and workload history.
In order to evaluate a placement plan, the application has to provide 1) an
evaluation function f (P,S ,L) that evaluates a placement plan under a certain
workload and returns a score, and 2) a threshold T that specifies the minimal
score change that can trigger VM migration. Using f , the scheduler iterates
through all possible placement plans and gets a set of candidate placement
plans D that maximize the score and outperform the current placement plan
Pcurrent by at least T , that is:
D = argmax
P
{ f (P,S ,L)| f (P,S ,L) ≥ f (Pcurrent,S ,L)+T }
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To choose a placement plan in D, the scheduler compares each placement
plan with the current placement Pcurrent and selects the one that requires the
fewest migrations.
Below we present case studies to demonstrate policies for two different types
of applications.
Non-Distributed Applications
For a single VM running a non-distributed application such as a MySQL
database, a placement plan is simply the location of the VM: P = {p}. We can
deploy a set of service front-ends located in different data centers to collect user
requests and forward them to the VM. This architecture makes the location of
the VM transparent to clients and can help with simplifying placement evalua-
tion (Section 3.3.3).
The goal of placement is to minimize average latency for all front-ends. Here
we only consider latency in the network and ignore processing time for different
types of requests. S is defined as:
S = {(s1,ds1), (s2,ds2), ..., (sn,dsn)}
where n is the number of front-ends, si is the number of active clients of the ith
front-end, and dsi is its location.
Each front-end is assigned a weight, which equals the number of requests it
receives. The score of a placement plan is the weighted average latency of all
front-ends (negated so lower latencies result in higher scores), that is,
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f (P,S ,L) = −
n∑
i=1
si ·L(dsi , p)
Distributed Applications with Replicated State
Distributed applications typically maintain replicated state using some con-
sensus protocol. Below we use ZooKeeper as an example. ZooKeeper is im-
plemented using a replicated ensemble of servers kept consistent using Zab
(ZooKeeper Atomic Broadcast) [77]. In Zab, one server acts as a leader that com-
municates with a majority of servers to agree on a total order of updates. Read
requests are handled by any node in the ensemble, while write requests must
be broadcast by the leader and agreed upon by the majority of the ensemble.
For a ZooKeeper ensemble with m nodes, a placement plan is the location
of all nodes: P = {p1, p2, ..., pm}, where pl is the location of the leader. Again
we assume that there are n front-ends in different data centers to collect and
forward client requests. To evaluate a placement plan, we need to consider read
and write requests separately. So:
S = {(r1,w1,ds1), (r2,w2,ds2), ..., (rn,wn,dsn)}
ri and wi are the number of read and write requests received by the ith front-end
and dsi is its location.
The goal of placement is again to minimize average network latency for all
front-ends, ignoring request processing time and only considering network de-
lay. For the purpose of load balancing, ZooKeeper clients are typically con-
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nected randomly to one node in the ensemble. Read requests can return imme-
diately. For the ith front-end, the expected read latency is
Ri = avg
j=1...m
L(dsi , p j)
Write requests are processed in three steps:
• Step 1: a write request from the ith front-end goes randomly to one of the
ZooKeeper nodes. The average latency is:
W(1)i = avg
j=1...m
L(dsi , p j)
• Step 2: the write request is then forwarded to the leader of the ensemble.
The average latency for this step is:
W(2)i = avg
j=1...m
L(p j, pl)
• Step 3: the leader broadcasts the request twice in a protocol similar to two-
phase commit, and for each broadcast it must wait until at least half of the
ensemble replies. The average latency for this step is:
W(3)i = 2× medianj=1...m, j,lL(pl, p j)
So the expected network latency for a write request from the ith front-end
is: Wi =W
(1)
i +W
(2)
i +W
(3)
i . The evaluation function for ZooKeeper calculates the
weighted average network latency of all requests, assuming that we give read
and write requests a weight α and β respectively:
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f (P,S ,L) = −
n∑
i=1
(α ·Ri · ri+β ·Wi ·wi)
3.3.5 Discussion
The benefits of the Supercloud do not come without costs. For example, nested
virtualization imposes performance overhead including CPU scheduling delay
and I/O overhead. Users can evaluate this tradeoff based on migration fre-
quency and performance requirements, and it is application-dependent. We
are currently in the process of building support for containers into the Super-
cloud. Container technology [110] provides another way to homogenize differ-
ent cloud platforms. However, compared to live VM migration, which is mature
and widely used, container migration [94] technology is preliminary and in-
volves a checkpointing/resume mechanism that might cause a relatively large
performance hiccup. Even with mature container migration, the challenges of
building a well-performing Supercloud remain essentially the same.
3.4 Evaluation
The Library cloud represents a powerful abstraction and its implementation via
the Supercloud represents a new and unique capability: A distributed service
can migrate live, and incrementally or whole, between availability zones and
heterogeneous cloud providers. In this section, we investigate four research
questions enabled by and enabling this abstraction and capability:
1. How effective is the abstraction and its scheduler in enabling applications
to follow-the-sun?
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2. Is VM migration a viable approach to follow-the-sun?
3. How effective is SDRS in saving the cost of running an application?
4. What is the efficacy of Supercloud storage and networking in supporting
live VM migration?
3.4.1 Follow the Sun
In this set of experiments, we use a distributed application, ZooKeeper (Sec-
tion 3.4.1), and a database, MySQL (Section 3.4.1), to investigate application
performance benefits due to following the sun. Results demonstrate that the
Supercloud scheduler was able to automatically follow the sun and migrate re-
sources geographically and across heterogeneous clouds, enabling high perfor-
mance to be maintained.
A ZooKeeper Ensemble
ZooKeeper writes require a majority of ZooKeeper servers (aka, the ensemble)
and a ZooKeeper leader to coordinate and order all writes. High network la-
tency between ZooKeeper servers or between clients and the ZooKeeper leader
causes high end-to-end service latencies. For good performance, the majority
of ZooKeeper servers have to be located where most active clients are, and the
ZooKeeper leader must be part of that majority.
Experiment setup: To evaluate the efficacy of following the sun using the
scheduler described in Section 3.3.4, we used a ZooKeeper distributed appli-
cation and measured its ability to respond to clients in two different regions,
Virginia and Taiwan. The clients used a workload corresponding to a weeklong
86
trace of active MSN connections [49, Figure 5a]. The trace does not specify the
start time of the MSN workload—we made an educated guess based on the di-
urnal pattern in the data and assumed that the workload started at 12am at the
beginning of a Monday. Nor does the trace specify the absolute workload—we
scaled the workload so that the peak workload can be served by our ZooKeeper
cluster when latency is low. We varied load based on location and time: We
circularly shifted the start of the trace by 12 hours ahead to produce an identical
workload where the start of the trace from Virginia was 12 hours before starting
in Taiwan. The ZooKeeper clients randomly connected to one ZooKeeper server
and submitted blocking read and write requests in a ratio of 9:1. Each read op-
eration obtained a 64-byte ZooKeeper znode; each write operation overwrote a
64-byte znode. The clients ran on first-layer VMs in Virginia on Amazon VMs
and in Taiwan on Google VMs.
For the ZooKeeper ensemble, we deployed the servers in the Supercloud si-
multaneously spread across Amazon Virginia and Google Taiwan regions. The
type of first layer VMs used in our experiments was m3.xlarge in Amazon
and n1-standard-4 in Google, both of which had 4 vCPUs and 15GB mem-
ory. The ZooKeeper ensemble ran on three second-layer VMs, denoted as zk1,
zk2 and zk3. Each VM had 1GB RAM and 1 CPU core. We used one first
layer VM in each region to serve as the Supercloud storage server. The data of
the ZooKeeper nodes was stored on disk and propagated automatically by the
storage servers.
We implemented the scheduling evaluation functions for ZooKeeper dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.4. ZooKeeper server VMs reported VM load to the sched-
uler. How quickly the scheduler reacts to workload changes depends on the fre-
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Figure 3.6: ZooKeeper throughput (vertical dashed lines indicate the end of the
migrations).
quency of workload monitoring and evaluation. For this experiment, scheduler
placement evaluation was triggered every minute. Once a VM migration was
started, the scheduler waited until it finished before considering a new place-
ment. Migrations were performed in parallel, so going from one placement plan
to another was fast.
We evaluated ZooKeeper in three scenarios:
1. US Ensemble: all three ZooKeeper nodes, zk1, zk2, and zk3, were in
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Amazon Virginia;
2. Global Ensemble: zk1 and zk2 were in Amazon Virginia, and zk3 was
in Google Taiwan;
3. Dynamic Ensemble: the Supercloud scheduler automatically placed VMs
according to the workload.
To simplify experimentation and save cost, we sped up the trace by a factor
of 30 so that the one week trace could be replayed in less than six hours. The
performance of the US Ensemble and Global Ensemble was not affected by the
speed-up, while the performance of the Supercloud was slightly degraded since
migration was not sped up correspondingly.
Experimental results: Figure 3.6 shows the throughput (in operations per sec-
ond) for the three scenarios, US, Global, and Dynamic Ensembles. Each scenario
displays throughput measured for the United States (US) clients in Virginia
(“Observed US”), throughput measured for Asian clients in Taiwan (“Observed
Asia”), and throughput if latency were negligible (“Expected Aggregate”). The
throughput results observed by US and Asian clients are stacked on top of one
another (with US below Asia), so that the top of the throughput results for the
clients in Asia show the total aggregate throughput that was observed by all
clients. For the US Ensemble scenario, Figure 3.6a, US clients were able to reach
their maximum throughput, but clients in Asia suffered from high latencies,
and, as a result, experienced poor throughput. For the Global Ensemble, Fig-
ure 3.6b, by placing one node in Taiwan, 1/3rd of Asian clients experienced in-
creased read throughput and total throughput was improved. However, 2/3rd
of the read requests and all write requests from Asian clients still experienced
poor throughput. Moreover, US clients were not able to reach their maximum
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Figure 3.7: ZooKeeper latency CDF.
throughput during peak times because 1/3rd of clients were connected to the
ZooKeeper server in Taiwan. Finally, Figure 3.6c, shows the result for the Su-
percloud case where throughput remained high and matched the expected per-
formance as the scheduler was able to automatically migrate ZooKeeper servers
to the region where load was high.
Figure 3.7 shows the cumulative latency distributions for read and write op-
erations. We can see that for the US Ensemble, Figure 3.7a, 90% of US clients ob-
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served less than 15ms latency for read and write operations, while client laten-
cies in Asia were close to 200ms. (We repeated the experiments with an Asia En-
semble and observed symmetric results.) In the Global Ensemble, Figure 3.7b,
the ZooKeeper quorum was in the US. The server in Taiwan helped Asian clients
gain better read throughput, though write latency did not improve: 37% reads
from Asian clients completed in 15ms because they were handled by the server
in Taiwan. The high tail latency of US read/write performance was because
some requests went to the server in Taiwan. (A symmetric experiment with the
quorum in Asia observed the same results.)
Finally, in the Dynamic Ensemble, Figure 3.7c, the scheduler automatically
figured out that placing all three nodes in one location was the best placement
for the workload. This is because clients connect to servers randomly and the
read/write ratio is fixed. For example, leaving one node in Asia can only im-
prove performance of one third of read requests from Asia, but also make one
third of read requests from the US suffer from long latency. This was not bene-
ficial when the US workload was higher than the Asia workload. Therefore, it
always migrated the whole ensemble together: The scheduler migrated the en-
semble every 12 hours between Amazon Virginia and Google Taiwan to make
the ZooKeeper cluster close to most clients. The scheduler placement resulted
in low latency: 61% of writes and 69% of reads were less than 15ms. About 30%
of requests had longer latency since they were from clients accessing the servers
remotely. However, on average the Dynamic Ensemble experiment achieved
significantly lower and more balanced latency across all clients than US Ensem-
ble and Global Ensemble.
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A Single MySQL Database
Experiment setup: We used the TPC-W benchmark to stress a single MySQL
database, and deployed web servers in two first-layer VMs in the Amazon Vir-
ginia and Google Taiwan regions. The TPC-W benchmark clients performed
80% browsing (read) and 20% ordering (write).
The MySQL database ran in the Supercloud in a second layer VM that had 3
vCPUs and 2GB memory. The first-layer VM could run in the Amazon Virgina
or Google Taiwan regions with instances described in Section 3.4.1. The storage
engine of MySQL was set to MEMORY.
For comparison, we evaluated three scenarios:
1. First Layer Database: The database was deployed in a first-layer VM lo-
cated in Taiwan;
2. Second Layer Database without Migration: The database was deployed
in a second-layer VM located in the Taiwan;
3. Second Layer Database with Migration: The database was deployed in
a second-layer VM, and the Supercloud scheduler automatically migrated
the VM back and forth between Amazon Virginia and Google Taiwan re-
gions according to the workload.
Experimental results: Figure 3.8 shows the results: Cumulative latency distri-
butions for web interactions. There are a several points to observe. First, for the
first- or second-layer databases without migration, 80% of the clients in Taiwan
(“Asian Clients”) observed less than 10ms latency, while latencies for clients
in Virginia (“US Clients”) were close to 200ms. Comparing with the latency of
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Figure 3.8: TPC-W Client Latency CDF
Asian clients in the first two scenarios, we can see a slight difference in the curve
caused by the small overhead that the Supercloud presents.
In the third case, “2nd=Layer DB w/ Migration”, the Supercloud scheduler
automatically migrated the MySQL database every 12 hours between Taiwan
and Virginia to place the database where load was high. As a result, the ag-
gregate throughput to match the workload. Figure 3.8 shows that latencies for
70% web interactions were less than 10ms. The tail latency was caused by re-
quests issued in the night of the corresponding region when the database was
far away. The small plateaus in the curves were caused by the 20% ordering
requests that write to the database and incur a higher latency. And the Asian
clients observed a slightly shorter latency, which indicated that the Google VMs
experienced lower latencies than the Amazon VMs.
3.4.2 Comparing Migration Approaches
In this set of experiments, we use two popular distributed applications, Cassan-
dra and ZooKeeper, to investigate the viability of relying on live VM migration
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via the Supercloud to enable distributed applications to follow-the-sun. The
results demonstrate that not only can distributed applications benefit from the
Supercloud, but they can also do so without any change to the application and
can outperform other approaches that require application modification.
Cassandra Migration
Cassandra [5] supports adding and removing nodes and automatically handles
data replication and load distribution. When following the sun, it makes little
sense to move only some of the Cassandra nodes. Migrating an entire Cassandra
cluster can be implemented by adding nodes in the destination location and
removing nodes in the source location.
Experiment setup: To compare migration approaches, “application” and “Su-
percloud”, we started a 3-node Cassandra cluster in the Amazon Virginia re-
gion, then migrated the whole cluster to the Google Taiwan region. As a result,
the migration was across geographically separated clouds. We deployed a 3-
node Cassandra cluster with replication factor of 2 in second-layer VMs with
1vCPU and 2GB memory. For the first-layer VMs, we used m3.xlarge in-
stances in the Amazon Virginia region and n1-standard-4 instances in the
Google Taiwan region.
For the application migration approach, a Cassandra cluster was initially
running in Virginia. To move all nodes to Taiwan, we followed the process spec-
ified in the Cassandra documentation for replacing running nodes in the cluster.
Three new nodes in Taiwan joined the cluster with a configuration file pointing
to a seed node and automatically propagated their information through Cas-
sandra’s gossip protocol. The key space then spread evenly across all six nodes
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of different migration mechanisms for moving a Cas-
sandra cluster.
and the data associated with the key moved automatically. After the three new
nodes joined the cluster, we performed “node decommissioning” in each of the
three original nodes. As a result, the Virginia nodes copied their data to the
Taiwan nodes. The gossip protocol automatically updated each node with the
cluster information transparently to the clients.
For the Supercloud migration, we set up a Supercloud across the Amazon
Virginia and Google Taiwan regions using the same first- and second-layer VM
configurations described above.
For the workload, data was stored in memory and moved explicitly with the
application approach or migrated with the VM with the Supercloud approach.
We populated the database with 30,000 key/value pairs, each of which had a
size of 1KB. We started one client in each region. The clients read and wrote
to the database continuously with a ratio of 4:1; each read operation obtained
the value of a random key, and each write request updated the value of a ran-
dom key. The consistency level was set to ONE (default), indicating eventual
consistency.
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Experimental results: Figure 3.9(a) shows the throughput of application mi-
gration (in operations per second) for both Amazon Virginia and Google Taiwan
clients. Although not easy to see in this case, the throughput results for both
types of clients are again stacked on top of one another, with the throughput
of the Asia clients below that of the throughput of the US clients. The top of
the graph therefore shows the total aggregate throughput. During migration,
the throughput dropped dramatically and remained low for about 200 seconds.
Even after the migration completed, it took another 200 seconds to restore per-
formance to the original throughput due to the overhead of data replication.
With the VM migration mechanism in the Supercloud, we migrated the three
Cassandra VMs from Amazon Virginia to Google Taiwan in parallel. Total mi-
gration time was around two minutes, but note that most of this time happens
in the background without affecting the application. Figure 3.9(b) shows that
performance impact was small with a downtime of around 5 seconds. (Down-
time could be reduced further by synchronizing the migration finishing time—a
project we plan for future work.) The Supercloud maintained the same IP ad-
dresses and network topology, without triggering any unnecessary data repli-
cation or key shuffling.
ZooKeeper Migration
Experiment setup: To evaluate different follow-the-sun approaches for
ZooKeeper, we set up a Supercloud using Amazon EC2 m3.xlarge instances
(4 vCPUs, 15GB memory) in the Virginia and Tokyo regions. We deployed a
ZooKeeper ensemble in three second-layer VMs with 1 vCPU and 1GB memory.
The leader was initially in Virginia, with one follower in Virginia and another
in Tokyo. We started one client in each region generating a constant workload
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with read/write ratio 9:1. Each read operation obtained a 1KB ZooKeeper zn-
ode; each write operation overwrote a 1KB znode.
We compared three approaches.
1. A “2-step reconfiguration” moved a majority of the servers from one re-
gion to another: We first added a new node in Tokyo, then removed the
original leader in Virginia.
Unfortunately, the 2-step reconfiguration does not guarantee that a node
in Tokyo will be elected as the leader. Instead, it was more likely that one
of the Virginia nodes would become the leader, which was not desirable
since the majority of the ensemble is in Tokyo.
2. A “3-step reconfiguration” ensured that the leader ended up in Tokyo
while maintaining the same level of fault tolerance: We added two nodes
in Tokyo first, then removed both nodes from Virginia. After the new
leader was elected in Tokyo, we added a new node in Virginia and re-
moved one of the nodes from Tokyo.
3. Using the Supercloud we transparently migrated a second-layer VM run-
ning the leader from Virginia to Tokyo. Neither ZooKeeper nor clients
required any modification.
Experimental results: Figure 3.10 shows the stacked throughput (in opera-
tions per second) of clients in both Virginia and Tokyo regions before and after
leader migration using the three migration approaches discussed above. After
the 2-step reconfiguration shown in Figure 3.10(a), the leader role was switched
to a Virginia node while the two followers were in Tokyo, which was inefficient
and, as a result, the throughput dropped significantly for both clients. Using
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of different migration mechanisms for moving the
ZooKeeper leader.
the 3-step reconfiguration in Figure 3.10(b), the leader was successfully moved
to Tokyo so good throughput for the Tokyo clients were achieved. Unfortu-
nately, the 3-step reconfiguration took 20 seconds during which performance
was inconsistent and low. Finally, Figure 3.10(c) shows the performance of the
Supercloud: the drop in performance was less than a second and transparent to
the ZooKeeper application and its clients.
3.4.3 Dynamic Resource Scheduling
To examine the efficacy of SDRS, we evaluate it in a private cloud using the TPC-
W benchmark. The first-layer VMs have 8GB memory and 8 CPU cores, but we
only leave 2.5GB memory and 2 CPU cores for the second-layer Domain-0 and
OpenStack Domain-U, and always restrict user VMs to use one other CPU core
and 1GB memory. This mimics an environment where first-layer VMs have 3
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Figure 3.11: Evaluation of SDRS. Dashed lines show the number of first-layer
VMs being used.
CPU cores and 3.5GB memory in total. Each second-layer user VM has 1GB
memory and 1 CPU core.
In order to decide whether VM consolidation should be performed, the
SDRS scheduler needs to estimate future workload of applications. Previous
studies have demonstrated that workloads for enterprise applications typically
show a periodicity which is a multiple of hours, days, or weeks [63]. It is a
common practice to schedule a VM consolidation plan based on the repeat-
ing pattern of application workloads. Workload prediction and modeling tech-
niques [111, 127, 107, 124] can also be applied to SDRS. In this experiment, we
assume that the workload has a predictable recurring pattern. Three TPC-W
clients follow a synthetic workload and feed requests to three TPC-W servers
running in different second-layer VMs respectively. This workload is carefully
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chosen so that neither the client nor the network can be overloaded.
We compare three scenarios: no over-subscription (MAX), when three second-
layer VMs running the TPC-W servers are in separated first-layer VMs, so that
resources are always guaranteed; always over-subscribed (MIN), when all three
second-layer VMs are packed into one first-layer VM using memory ballooning;
dynamic consolidation (SDRS), when SDRS dynamically migrates VMs. Since the
workload pattern is known in advance, we use a pre-defined scheduling plan.
Memory size of the VMs is adjusted on the fly so that VMs can use as much
memory as possible.
Figure 3.11 shows the 5-second moving average of aggregate WIPS (web in-
teraction per second) of all three TPC-W servers. MAX wastes many resources,
while MIN significantly hurts the performance. In contrast, SDRS on average
uses only 2.13 first-level VMs throughout the experiment, by paying only 1.5%
performance degradation. That translates to 29% lower cost than MAX during
a half hour experiment.
3.4.4 Storage Evaluation
Experiment setup: To evaluate storage performance under migration, we de-
ployed a Supercloud setup with two m3.xlarge instances in Amazon Virginia
and Northern California regions. The ping latency between two VMs in these
regions was 75ms. We started a user VM with 1 virtual CPU core and 512MB
memory and ran the DBENCH [6] benchmark in it, which simulated four clients
generating 500,000 operations each on the filesystem based on the standard
NetBench benchmark. We configured the DBENCH clients so that they ran at
the fastest possible speed. Without migration, a VM using local storage finished
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the benchmark in two minutes.
In the following experiments, immediately after starting the benchmark, we
triggered a VM migration from Virginia to Northern California. The full mi-
gration took 40 to 50 seconds (most of which was in the background while the
VM kept running). During most of the full migration, in particular during the
pre-copy phase, the benchmark kept running at the old location. In fact, before
the VM was actually moved to Northern California, one third of the workload
had finished.
We compared the performance of the benchmark with four different under-
lying storage systems:
• NFS: A traditional NFS server deployed in Amazon Virginia.
• Sync-on-Write: A strongly consistent geo-replicated store that syn-
chronously propagates each write.
• On-demand: Supercloud storage with proactive propagation turned off.
• Supercloud: Supercloud storage with proactive propagation in the back-
ground.
Except for NFS, all schemes were implemented in the Supercloud’s propa-
gation manager for fair comparison.
Experiment result: Figure 3.12 shows the results: The average throughput
in each second of the DBENCH benchmark. The vertically dashed lines in-
dicate when migration was finished. Figure 3.12a, NFS, shows that through-
put dropped significantly after the clients were migrated. Low performance
resulted from remote disk accesses that incurred high latency. Figure 3.12b,
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Figure 3.12: Average throughput per second of the DBENCH benchmark in the
migrated VM. For clarity, the x-axes are on different scales.
sync-on-write, shows that a strongly consistent geo-replicated storage incurs
high performance overhead both before and after migration because each write
needs to be propagated through the wide area network. Figure 3.12c, Super-
cloud on-demand, eventually achieved good average throughput after migra-
tion since all writes could be committed locally. However, read throughput was
low right after migration since no blocks had been copied ahead of time. Fi-
nally, Figure 3.12d, Supercloud proactive propagation, shows that most read
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Figure 3.13: Average throughput and total WAN traffic of the DBENCH bench-
mark in the migrated VM.
and write requests could be served locally. Consequently, the corresponding
benchmark took the least time.
Figure 3.13a shows the average throughput for each case. We repeated the
same experiment three times and report the average number with standard de-
viation. The Supercloud proactive propagation achieved the highest through-
put.
Figure 3.13b shows the total WAN traffic measured at the migration des-
tination (Northern California). The migration caused 850MB of WAN traffic
for NFS, On-demand, and Supercloud, but only 570MB of traffic for Sync-on-
Write. Unsurprisingly, the migration traffic depended on the rate at which the
VM dirties memory pages. A benchmark running at a higher speed caused
more dirty memory pages to be copied during migration. Sync-on-Write stor-
age results in low throughput in the benchmark, thus lowering the page dirty
rate of the whole VM. Both NFS and Sync-on-Write incur many outgoing traf-
fic when accessing storage because each disk write needed to go through the
WAN. Sync-on-Write also had higher incoming traffic, which was generated
when the benchmark was running in Virginia. On-demand achieved the lowest
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WAN traffic since it fetched data remotely only when necessary, and no update
propagation was needed. The Supercloud incurred more incoming traffic than
On-demand because it pushed some data that was not needed, but it achieved
higher throughput and predictable performance.
3.4.5 Network Evaluation
To evaluate the network performance of the Supercloud, we deployed the Su-
percloud in two m3.xlarge instances in the Amazon Virginia region and mea-
sured UDP latency (using UDP ping) and TCP throughput (using netperf)
between second-layer Domain-0 VMs and Domain-U VMs respectively. For
comparison, we ran the same benchmark using the following settings:
• Non-nested: a setup where we ran the benchmark directly in the first-layer
VMs for baseline purposes.
• OpenVPN: a VPN solution using a centralized controller, also running in
Amazon Virginia.
• tinc: a P2P VPN solution, which implements full-mesh routing.
• Supercloud: the Supercloud implementation based on Open vSwitch.
For the latency test, we ran 50 UDP pings (1 ping per second). Figure 3.14a
shows the average latency and standard deviation across all runs. Although
our Open vSwitch-based virtual network slightly increases the UDP latency, the
overhead was much smaller than either OpenVPN or tinc. The latency for Dom0
was smaller than DomU because network packets to DomU go through Dom0
first. OpenVPN had the highest latency because all packets travel through the
centralized controller.
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Figure 3.14: Network performance evaluations.
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Figure 3.15: Impact of using public IP front-ends.
To measure TCP throughput, we enabled jumbo frames in all setups and
repeated a netperf TCP stream benchmark with default options 10 times for
each setup. As shown in Figure 3.14b, the throughput of non-nested instances,
Dom0, and DomU in the Supercloud all achieved 1Gbps with small variance. In
contrast, tinc and OpenVPN could only achieve 300Mbps. Because both tinc and
OpenVPN use a tap device connected to a user-level process, the extra memory
copy and kernel-user mode context switching incurred significant overhead.
To evaluate the impact of using public IP front-ends, we deployed a second-
layer VM as a server running in the Amazon Oregon region. We had two clients
running in Google Compute Engine Oregon and Tokyo regions respectively and
used the hping tool to measure TCP latency from clients to the server with and
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Figure 3.16: Migration time and traffic with different number of VMs.
without public IP front-ends. Each test was repeated 15 times. Without public
IP front-ends, the clients used the public IP address of the first-layer VM directly
to communicate with the server. With public IP front-ends, each client commu-
nicated with a front-end running in a nearby Amazon data center. Figure 3.15
shows the average TCP latency from different clients to the server in both cases.
For the Oregon client, the overhead of adding a front-end was negligible. Inter-
estingly, the Tokyo client measured lower latency by going through the public
IP front-end in Tokyo. This was because the front-end was running in an Ama-
zon data center, and the latency from Amazon Tokyo to Amazon Oregon was
significantly less than the latency from Google Tokyo to Amazon Oregon.
3.4.6 Scalability
In this section, we evaluate scalability of Supercloud live migration by migrat-
ing a Cassandra cluster with varying numbers of nodes. We set up a Supercloud
in the Amazon EC2 Oregon and Tokyo regions. In each region we deployed 16
c4.xlarge nodes (4 vCPUs, 7.5GB memory) for running second-layer VMs.
We chose 16 as the cluster size in each region because for an ordinary user Ama-
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Figure 3.17: Workload trace of migrating a 64-VM Cassandra cluster.
zon imposes a default limit of 20 on the number of EC2 instances in a single
region, and we also had to run other instances for storage and workload gener-
ators.
We started 8 to 64 second-layer VMs for running Cassandra. Each second-
layer VM had 1GB memory and 1 vCPU. The key space was evenly distributed
across the whole cluster, and the replication factor was set to 2. The workload
generator was the same as what was used in Section 3.4.2: each region had a
client generating read and write operations on random keys with a ratio of 4:1.
The Cassandra cluster was initially in the Oregon region.
Figure 3.16 shows the network traffic and time taken to migrate the entire
Cassandra cluster from the Oregon region to the Tokyo region while running
the workload generator. Network traffic increases approximately linearly with
the number of second-layer VMs because we need to copy at least 1GB memory
for each second-layer VM. It is possible to reduce total migration time and traffic
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by deduplicating the copied memory pages, which is left for future work.
“Degradation Time” shows the time during which the total throughput of
all clients dropped by more than 50%. We can see that the degradation time
increased with the number of VMs. This is because the workload generator we
used issued synchronous requests one by one to random Cassandra nodes. Any
time the cluster was split in two different locations, throughput of the workload
was affected significantly. Figure 3.17 shows the stacked workload trace of the
US and Asian clients when the cluster size was 64. The vertical dash lines in-
dicates the time when the first and last VM was migrated. As we can see the
total throughput dropped until the whole cluster was moved. As part of future
work, we want to develop an “ensemble live migration” mechanism where the
foreground stop-and-copy phase of the migration is synchronized across virtual
machines. Doing so should significantly reduce the time during which perfor-
mance is degraded.
3.5 Summary
A Library Cloud is a cloud that can seamlessly span multiple cloud providers
and support user-level resource management. The Supercloud is an instance of
a Library Cloud and presents a complete cloud software stack under the user’s
full control that can seamlessly span multiple availability zones and cloud
providers, including private clouds. It features live migration, as well as shared
storage, virtual networking, and automated scheduling of workloads, placing
and migrating VM resources as needed. Spanning availability zones and cloud
providers, the Supercloud provides maximal flexibility for placement. Using
our automated schedulers, we demonstrate continuous low latency for diurnal
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workloads that it is important for global cloud services to be able to “follow the
sun”.
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CHAPTER 4
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we discuss work related to our contributions, the techniques
they build on, and alternate or complementary approaches.
4.1 X-Containers
Table 4.1 summarizes properties of the X-Container architecture and alternative
approaches. Below we discuss why those other approaches cannot satisfy all of
our design goals.
OS-level virtualization: OS-level virtualization [110] provides a lightweight
mechanism to support containers with the illusion of a dedicated OS. Docker [7],
LXC [12], OpenVZ [18], and Solaris Zones [101] are different implementations
of OS-level virtualization. Generally these solutions provide poor kernel cus-
tomization support, and application isolation is a concern due to the sharing of
a large OS kernel.
X-Container Linux Virtual Unikernel, LibraryOS Graphene UML Dune SCONE
Containers Machine EbbRT, OSv (Exokernel)
Small TCB and Attack Surface 3 7 3 3 3 7 7 7 3
Optimized Kernel Access 3 7 7 3 3 3 7 P4 3
Kernel Customization 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Full Linux ABI Support 3 3 3 7 7 P1 3 7 7
Multi-Process Support 3 3 3 7 7 3 3 7 7
Portability 3 3 P2 P3 3 3 3 7 7
Scalability 3 3 7 3 3 7 7 3 7
1 Only supports about 1/3 of Linux system calls.
2 Requires hardware virtualization support except Xen-Blanket PV instances.
3 Need to compile to different images for different clouds.
4 Some system calls are served by the host kernel by using VMEXIT instructions.
Table 4.1: Comparing X-Container with alternative approaches (3-Fully Sup-
ported; P-Partially Supported; 7-Not Supported)
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Library OS: The concept of a Library OS [57, 100, 29, 50, 87] is to keep the ker-
nel small and link an application with functions that are traditionally performed
in the kernel. Most Library OSs [57, 27, 69, 100, 103] focus on single-process ap-
plications, which is not sufficient for supporting multi-process container envi-
ronments, nor can they support Linux applications in general. Graphene [115] is
a Library OS that supports multiple Linux processes, but it does not provide full
Linux application binary interface (ABI) support. (For example, only one third
of Linux system calls are supported.) Moreover, multiple processes use IPC
calls to access a shared POSIX implementation, which limits its performance
and scalability. Finally, the underlying host kernel of Graphene is a full-fledged
Linux kernel, which does not reduce the TCB and attack surface.
Virtual Machines: Virtual machines [52, 113, 33, 82] support packaging appli-
cations and the OS into a single unit. Xen-Blanket [122] enables portable par-
avirtualization of nested VMs in public clouds. However, running applications
in full-fledged VMs is not scalable and resource-efficient because they also run
many unrelated processes and services. In addition, the OSs in VMs introduce
unnecessary isolation overhead when processes are trusting each other.
Lightweight Virtual Machines: Unikernel [89] and EbbRT [105] can compile
application source code directly into a lightweight virtual machine running in
the cloud. Similarly, OSv [19] is a language runtime that runs an application
in a single address space with a lightweight OS in a VM. Unlike Unikernel,
EbbRT, and OSv, which only support single process and require re-writing or re-
compiling the application, X-Containers support multi-process and binary level
compatibility, and can be immediately deployed to all major cloud platforms.
In addition, X-Container supports all debugging and profiling features that are
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available in Linux.
User Mode Linux (UML): User mode Linux (UML) [54] allows running
a Linux kernel in user space and supports multiple processes. Similar to
Graphene, UML runs on top of a full-fledged Linux kernel, not reducing the
TCB or attack surface. Moreover, the address space of the UML kernel and its
user processes are isolated. Interrupts are implemented as signals and system
calls are implemented with ptrace, both at significant overhead. Usermode
Kernel [61] is an idea similar to X-Containers that runs parts of the 32-bit Linux
kernel in userspace in VM environments. However, some parts of the User-
mode Kernel still run in a higher privilege level than user mode processes, and
it is not integrated with application container environments.
Dune: Dune [34, 35] is a system that runs a process with a LibOS using hard-
ware virtualization. Dune processes are tightly coupled with the underly-
ing Linux kernel performing system calls with VMEXIT instructions, while X-
Containers run on an exokernel. Dune is based on a process isolation model,
while X-Containers isolate groups of processes efficiently sharing the same Li-
bOS. Although Dune provides a modified version of libc, it is not sufficient to
achieve the same level of compatibility as X-Containers, which can run appli-
cations, containers, and even Linux kernel modules unmodified. Finally, Dune
cannot run within a VM in the public cloud because it requires nested hardware
virtualization support, which public clouds do not expose.
SCONE: SCONE [31] implements secure containers using Intel SGX. How-
ever, all SCONE containers still share the same kernel, a single point of vulner-
ability. Moreover, due to hardware limitations, SCONE cannot support running
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multiple processes within a container. Finally, SCONE requires relinking the
application to a special Library OS.
4.2 Library Cloud
4.2.1 Multi-Cloud Deployment
Multi-cloud deployment is attractive to users because of its high availability and
cost-effectiveness. SafeStore [83], DepSky [40], HAIL [44], RACS [26], SPAN-
Store [126], Hybris [55] and SCFS [41] have demonstrated benefits of multi-
cloud storage, but they do not support computational resources. Docker [7] de-
ploys applications encapsulated in Linux containers (LXC) to multiple clouds.
Although light-weight, LXC is not as flexible as a VM because all containers
must share the same kernel, and it has poor migration support. Ravello [20]
leverages a nested hypervisor to provide an encapsulated environment for de-
bugging and development distributed applications, but it does not addresses
the challenges of providing storage and network support for wide-area ap-
plication migration. Platforms like fos [120], Rightscale [21], AppScale [4],
TCloud [118], IBM Altocumulus [91], and Conductor [121] enable multi-cloud
application deployment, but none of them provides the generality and flexibil-
ity of a multi-cloud IaaS.
4.2.2 Wide-area VM Migration
VM live migration [51] has been widely used for resource consolidation and
workload burst handling [72, 95, 46]. A traditional VM live migration only
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involves memory transfer and assumes the disk image is shared. The pre-
copy strategy [51] is the most widely used memory transfer technology. Post-
copy [73] has been proposed to eliminate duplicated transmission in pre-copy.
However, VM live migration is not exposed to end users of public clouds.
Migrating a VM in the wide-area network faces long latency in accessing a
shared disk image. To address this problem, Bradford et al. [45] propose to it-
eratively copy the image in parallel with the memory. CloudNet [123] presents
optimizations that minimize the cost of storage transfer and memory. Hirofuchi
et al. [74] combine on-demand fetching and a background copy after the mem-
ory is migrated. Mashtizadeh et al. [90] describe various solutions used for live
storage migration in VMware ESX. Zheng et al [129] optimize storage migra-
tion by leveraging temporal and spatial locality. Nicolae et al. [96] propose a
hybrid local storage transfer scheme for live migrating VMs with I/O inten-
sive workloads—it combines pre-copy, post-copy, and prioritized prefetching
based on access frequency. CloudSpider [42] combines VM image replication
and scheduling—it replicates the VM image asynchronously in the background,
but the image needs to be synced before migration is finished. Seagull [67] fa-
cilitates cloud bursting by determining which applications can be transferred
into the cloud most economically—it uses opportunistic pre-copy to transfer an
incremental snapshot of a VM’s disk state. Our proactive approach attempts to
only transfer data that is critical to performance.
VMFlockMS [28] exploits similarity among VM images. VMFlockMS focuses
on offline VM migration, requiring to shut down the VM first. FVD [114] is a
new VM image format that supports copy-on-write, copy-on-read, and adap-
tive prefetching that can be used for optimizing the performance of migrating a
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VM with the disk image. However, FVD can prefetch data only after the VM re-
sumes on the destination. In contrast, our Supercloud storage proactively prop-
agates data before migration is triggered.
4.2.3 Dynamic Resource Scaling
Resource scaling has been widely studied. Fine-grained resource scaling solu-
tions adjust CPU, memory, and I/O resource allocation based on control the-
ory [130, 79, 98], workload prediction [107, 48], or workload modeling [112, 56].
Coarse-grained capacity scaling schemes dynamically adjust the number of
nodes in a distributed system [88]. VM cloning [84] and live migration are also
widely used for resource consolidation or workload burst handling [72, 95, 46].
Techniques such as fine-grained CPU capping or VM live migration are typi-
cally not available to cloud end-users. In addition, due to the complexity of
different applications, it is impractical for cloud providers to provide services
that can fit all requirements of any application. In contrast, users have much
more knowledge about the application and its requirements. In the Supercloud
users have control over their applications and have the flexibility and control in
choosing resource scaling solutions. All these techniques are compatible with
the Supercloud and indeed easier to support than in traditional clouds, which
would require the cloud provider to expose such functionality.
4.2.4 Nested Virtualization
Nested virtualization has been studied and theoretically analyzed in 1970s [64,
65, 99]. Belpaire et al. [36] created a formal model for recursive virtual machines
which needs a centralized supervisor. Lauer et al. [86] removed this require-
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ment and proposed to leverage nested virtual memories to create nested virtu-
alization environment. Belpair et. al. [37] presented a formal model of hard-
ware/software architecture which can be applied to recursive virtual machine
systems. The IBM z/VM hypervisor [97] is the first practical implementation of
nested virtualization, which relies on multi-level architectural support. These
solutions typically require hardware mechanisms and corresponding software
support which bear little resemblance to x86 architecture and operating systems.
A traditional x86 architecture has only a single level of architectural support
for virtualization. Ford et al. [58] proposed to enable nested virtualization on
x86 platforms by modifying the software stack at all levels based on a microker-
nel. Their goal is to enhance OS modularity flexibility and extensibility rather
than virtualizing legacy OS’es. As new hardware extensions are being added
into x86 platforms such as Intel-VT [116] and AMD-V [3], people start searching
for nested virtualization solutions that can utilize hardware primitives at dif-
ferent levels. The Turtles project [38] extended KVM with nested virtualization
support on Intel processors. It also improves the I/O performance by enabling
multi-level device assignment. Alexander et al. [66] implemented nested virtu-
alization based on AMD processors in KVM. Recently nested virtualization sup-
ports have been proposed for Xen hypervisor [70]. CloudVisor [128] protects the
privacy and integrity of customers’ virtual machines on commodity virtualized
infrastructures by introducing a tiny security monitor underneath the commod-
ity VMM and exposing nested virtualization support for guest VMs. Although
these nested virtualization solutions share many motivations with Xen-Blanket,
their major focus is how to support multi-level full virtualization with current
hardware primitives. In contrast, Xen-Blanket seeks for a practical solution for
nested para-virtualization, which has technical challenges fundamentally dif-
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ferent with that of exposing hardware support to multiple levels.
Blue Pill [60] is a root-kit emulating VMX in order to remain functional and
avoid detection when a hypervisor is installed in the system. it is loaded during
boot time by infecting the disk master boot record (MBR). Its nested virtualiza-
tion support is minimal since it only needs to remain undetectable. In contrast,
a comprehensive nested virtualization platform must efficiently multiplex the
hardware across multiple levels of virtualization, and manage all CPU, MMU,
and I/O resources. Berghmans [39] proposes another nested x86 virtualization
platform where a software-only hypervisor is running on a hardware-assisted
hypervisor. Different with this approach, Xen-Blanket does not assume any
hardware virtualization support.
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CHAPTER 5
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
By separating protection and management, cloud infrastructures can im-
prove security, flexibility, and efficiency. This dissertation applies this approach
to two important platforms in cloud infrastructures: the containers platform,
and the IaaS platform. In this chapter, we discuss some of the possible direc-
tions this technology may take in the future, and the problems relevant to those
directions.
5.1 X-Container-Based Supercloud
Superclouds leverage nested virtualization solutions such as Xen-Blanket
to provide a homogeneous computation environment across different cloud
providers. Nested virtualization incurs non-negligible overhead, especially in
x86-64 environments, as discussed in Chapter 2. The X-Container platform can
efficiently run in virtualized environments without introducing significant over-
head. Further, X-Containers run on the X-Kernel, which is essentially a VM
hypervisor that supports all existing hypervisor-level operations, such as live
migration, memory page sharing, and consolidation. These are compelling rea-
sons to replace the nested virtualization layer in the Supercloud with the X-
Containers platform and evaluate its performance and benefit.
5.2 X-Containers for Serverless Computing
Serverless computing is a new cloud service model in which cloud providers
execute user programs in response to pre-defined events. Users are charged
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based on actual resource consumption instead of pre-allocated capacity. There
are many advantages to the serverless computing model. For example, it is
more cost-effective than traditional cloud service models since it does not re-
quire preserving a fixed amount of resources. Developers do not need to spend
time setting up the environment and tuning system parameters. It also simpli-
fies programming because typically user-defined functions are single-threaded.
Most existing serverless computing platforms use containers as the underly-
ing mechanism for packaging and deploying user functions. However, due to
the concern of container security isolation, they often run containers in VMs,
which sacrifices performance and resource efficiency. X-Containers can po-
tentially provide a solution for serverless computing that not only improves
the security isolation of different users, but also improves performance and re-
source efficiency by supporting kernel customization. However, there are still
many challenges that need to be addressed. For example, spawning a new X-
Container can take two to three seconds, which is too slow for serverless com-
puting scenarios where containers are initialized and destroyed in milliseconds.
Further, X-Containers require a more efficient mechanism to share physical re-
sources such as memory. Although X-Containers can use memory ballooning to
adjust memory allocation, it is not as efficient as sharing memory among differ-
ent processes running on the same kernel.
5.3 Linux kernel optimized for X-Containers
The X-Container architecture enables great flexibility for customizing the OS
kernel for applications. For example, users can now install kernel modules as
needed, and they have the freedom to tune any kernel parameter. Further opti-
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mization is possible given the fact that there is no isolation between the kernel
and the user program.
The existing Linux kernel is designed and implemented based on the as-
sumption that user mode programs are untrusted. The mechanism used to send
notifications from the kernel to user programs involves many security check-
points. For example, signals, which represent one important method for imple-
menting kernel call-back functions, have significant overheads since using them
requires copying the stack between the kernel mode and the user mode for secu-
rity concerns. Other mechanisms require ad-hoc system call interfaces such as
ioctl or inotify, and may introduce a non-negligible scheduling delay. All
these overheads can be eliminated in X-Containers by opening new interfaces
for kernel callback functions. This enables many interesting design choices. For
example, we can implement kernel modules with high-level languages such as
Python and OCaml. We can call many user mode libraries even in the device
driver. For applications with low latency requirements, we can allow a direct
callback from the device driver with minimum overhead.
5.4 Efficient resource sharing and communication among X-
Containers
X-Containers are designed to enhance isolation among containers running on
the same physical host or VM. In a scenario where multiple containers are coop-
erating with each other, efficient resource sharing becomes critical. One possible
solution is found in Docker, which supports sharing file systems with the host
and other containers. We can also use a pipe to connect applications running in
different containers.
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It is more challenging to implement efficient resource sharing and commu-
nication in X-Containers than in Docker containers, because X-Containers only
share an exokernel, which implements very basic resource multiplexing and se-
curity isolation. In contrast, Docker containers share a full-fledged monolithic
Linux kernel which provides many mechanisms for resource sharing and inter-
process communications. In many cases, we can treat multiple X-Containers as
a distributed system and implement resource sharing with network functions.
For example, a shared file system can be implemented with NFS (Network File
System). However, this solution clearly introduces unnecessary overheads on
the network stack.
A better way to implement efficient resource sharing and communication
is by leveraging the low-level inter-container communication mechanism sup-
ported by the exokernel. In the X-Container architecture, we can do this by
using hypercalls and memory page sharing. For example, we can provide a
shared file system which uses hypercalls to synchronize the page cache in dif-
ferent X-Containers. The page cache can be even shared to further improve
memory utilization. As another example, we can provide a special pipe to con-
nect processes running in different X-Containers. The interface of the pipe is the
same as existing Linux pipes, but the underlying implementation can be based
on hypercalls and memory sharing. It is interesting to investigate how mech-
anisms implemented with hypervisor-level primitives compare to mechanisms
implemented with network-level communications.
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5.5 Online Vertical Scaling in the Library Cloud
One of the key motivations for users to adopt the cloud computing paradigm
is the elasticity enabled by horizontal scaling, that is, dynamically adding or
removing virtual machines (VMs) used by the application in response to work-
load fluctuations. Unfortunately, many applications do not support horizontal
scaling. In order to take advantage of dynamic cluster size, an application needs
to be programmed carefully to deal with load balancing, state replication, dis-
tributed transactions, and fault tolerance. Non-distributed applications (e.g., a
single MySQL database or an SVN repository) and distributed applications with
static memberships (e.g., ZooKeeper) cannot easily leverage horizontal scaling.
Even for applications that support horizontal scaling by, say, changing the num-
ber of shards, the overhead of re-sharding can be substantial. It would be ideal
if cloud providers supported another type of elasticity: vertical scaling, that is,
dynamically changing the size of a VM in terms of the number of CPU cores,
memory size, and I/O throughput.
Existing public cloud providers only support offline vertical scaling, which
requires that users turn off a VM before changing its size. Offline vertical scaling
has three major drawbacks: first, it is currently triggered manually; second, it
incurs a long service downtime; and third, it requires applications to re-initialize
the internal state and configurations. Because online vertical scaling is not sup-
ported in IaaS clouds, many VMs are kept idle in clouds, not because they are
running all the time, but because they are either supposed to be online 24 hours
a day or it is too hard for the user to re-initialize the state after a shutdown. In
this case, users are overpaying while resources are wasted.
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There are several reasons why existing cloud providers do not support on-
line vertical scaling. First, it complicates resource management. Increasing the
size of a VM on a physical server might prevent it from accepting new VMs,
which makes it hard to optimize resource utilization. Second, it introduces ad-
ditional complexity. Suppose the physical server on top of which the VM is
running does not have sufficient resources to satisfy a vertical scaling request.
Now the VM has to be live migrated, which incurs extra CPU, memory, and I/O
costs. Cloud providers do not have incentive to overcome these challenges, be-
cause users are paying for their resource reservations anyway, even when they
are under-utilized.
We believe that online vertical scaling is a missing piece of elasticity in IaaS
clouds that can be implemented without introducing any extra complication or
overhead to cloud providers. Leveraging online vertical scaling, users can im-
mediately get benefits of vertical scaling without waiting for any cloud provider
to give specific support. We also believe that vertical scaling should be auto-
matic, so that costs can be saved without the involvement of cloud users while
keeping the performance impact to applications minimal.
Online vertical scaling can be implemented in the Library Cloud, since users
of the Library Cloud have full control of the cloud stack. The basic approach
is to migrate applications live across VMs with different sizes. There are many
challenges that need to be addressed:
How to minimize performance overhead of nested virtualization? Existing
nested virtualization technologies focus on running a full-fledged hypervisor
inside a VM, with all security isolation mechanisms. Our observation is that
depending on the usage model, a nested hypervisor does not need to enable
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all isolation mechanisms. In the vertical scaling scenario, nested VMs and the
nested hypervisor are trusting each other if two nested VMs must be isolated,
we can simply run them in different underlying VMs. So in this case a nested
hypervisor should focus on providing device virtualization and enabling migra-
tion. We can provide a lightweight nested virtualization platform that is highly
optimized for this purpose with minimal performance overhead.
How to support migration with local storage? Public clouds allow VMs to al-
locate high-speed temporary storage. (Typically provisioned using local SSDs.)
Migrating an application across different VMs implies that the local storage has
to be moved as well. If we copy all data in the local storage when performing
migrations, it can cause long migration time and significant performance over-
head. On the other hand, serving the temporary storage remotely through the
network can eliminate the need for migration, but this sacrifices performance
benefits and adds network costs. We propose to provide a virtual SSD that is
implemented as a distributed disk with data in both local and remote disks.
Multiple levels of cache can be leveraged to match the performance of a real
SSD. The local disk can transfer data to the remote disk in order to minimize
data copy when performing migrations. Another direction we can explore is to
expose a weak consistency model in the temporary storage. Studies [108] have
demonstrated that many applications can tolerate a weak consistency model
for temporary data. By relaxing the consistency model, data copy can be further
reduced when migration is performed.
How to make online vertical scaling automatic? The challenge here is how to
provide an interface that allows users to easily customize the automatic scaling
policies for different types of applications. We can leverage the state machine
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model, with which users can specify multiple predefined instance types, along
with a set of transition rules to determine the next state of an instance. The tran-
sition rules can be based on a performance goal or a resource pressure threshold.
Another interesting direction is to investigate monitoring and handling resource
pressure propagation and bottleneck shifting.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
At the time of writing this dissertation, cloud infrastructures typically sacri-
fice efficiency and flexibility in order to guarantee security. Containers are run
in virtual machines, losing the benefit of resource efficiency, and kernel cus-
tomization for containers is not supported. IaaS platforms do not expose use-
ful administrative APIs, limiting the flexibility of migrating computation across
different locations and optimizing resource utilization.
We explored the approach of separating protection and management, a fun-
damental principle behind the exokernel architecture that was proposed to im-
prove traditional operating systems. By separating protection and manage-
ment, the protection layer can focus only on security isolation and resource
multiplexing, making security guarantee easier to maintain and verify. Re-
source management components are dedicated to each user or application for
customization and optimization, greatly improving flexibility and efficiency.
We applied the approach of separating protection and management to con-
tainers and IaaS platforms, and presented X-Containers and Library Cloud. X-
Containers provide strong security isolation and kernel customization support
to containers, while still supporting efficient container execution. Library Cloud
is a new abstraction that enables more flexible and efficient user-level resource
management without breaking security isolation between different users.
Cloud infrastructures are evolving all the time, with new service models
emerging and new architectures developing. But the requirement of security,
flexibility, and efficiency remains constant. This dissertation demonstrates that
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the principle of separating protection and management is effective in practice
on improving security, flexibility, and efficiency, and is widely applicable to dif-
ferent layers in the cloud infrastructure.
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GLOSSARY
A
API Application Programming Interface
C
cloud The data center hardware and software for cloud computing. See cloud
computing.
cloud computing Both the applications delivered as services over the Internet
and the hardware and systems software in the data centers that provide
those services [30].
cloud infrastructure The collection of hardware and software that enables
cloud computing.
cloud platform See cloud infrastructure.
cloud stack The architecture of a cloud with different layers exposing different
abstractions.
containers User-space instances virtualized by the OS kernel that have sepa-
rated views on the file system, network stack, user IDs and groups, and
processes.
D
data center A large group of networked computer servers typically used by
organizations for the remote storage, processing, or distribution of large
amounts of data.
E
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efficiency The capability of improving performance and reducing cost of re-
sources including hardware, energy, man power, money, and time.
elastic scaling The ability of a cloud service provider to provision flexible com-
puting power when and wherever required. The elasticity of these re-
sources can be in terms of processing power, storage, bandwidth, etc.
F
flexibility The support of user customization on cloud services and resource
management policies.
H
hypervisor Computer software, firmware or hardware that creates and runs
virtual machines [47].
I
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) A cloud service model that supports users to
deploy and run arbitrary software including operating systems and appli-
cations, and provides limited control of networking and storage compo-
nents [93].
Internet The global system of interconnected computer networks that use the
Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP) to link devices worldwide.
isolation Security isolation. See security.
IT Information Technology
M
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maintenance A process that is typically performed periodically to preserve an
asset’s operational status and original condition, compensating for normal
wear and tear.
multi-tenancy The capability with which a single instance of a software system
serves multiple tenants.
N
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
O
operating system (OS) System software that manages computer hardware and
software resources and provides common services for computer pro-
grams.
OS kernel The central component of an operating system that manages all
physical resources and provides low-level abstractions for programs.
P
platform The environment in which a piece of software is executed. It includes
hardware, the operating system (OS), and other software executing in it.
Platform as a Service (PaaS) A cloud service model that supports users to de-
ploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applica-
tions, using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools sup-
ported by the provider [93].
private cloud The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a sin-
gle organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business units). It
may be owned, managed, and operated by the organization, a third party,
or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises.
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private data center One type of data center that is operated solely for a single
organization. See data center.
provisioning (resource provisioning) The process of preparing computation
resources for serving users, such as allocating servers, bootstrapping soft-
ware systems, and connecting network components.
public cloud The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the gen-
eral public. It may be owned, managed, and operated by a business, aca-
demic, or government organization, or some combination of them. It ex-
ists on the premises of the cloud provider.
S
scalability The capability of a system, network, or process to handle a grow-
ing amount of work, or its potential to be enlarged to accommodate that
growth.
security The protection of user computation and resources against unautho-
rized access, data leakage, and malicious attacks or damages.
security isolation See security.
serverless computing A cloud computing execution model in which clouds
provide runtime environment to execute user programs on-demand, and
dynamically manage the allocation of physical resources.
Software as a Service (SaaS) A cloud service model that supports users to use
the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure [93].
Software-defined Networking (SDN) A technology that allows network ad-
ministrators to initialize, control, change, and manage network behavior
dynamically via open interfaces.
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TTrusted Computing Base (TCB) A small amount of software and hardware
that security depends on and that we distinguish from a much larger
amount that can misbehave without affecting security.
V
virtual machine (VM) An emulation of a computer system that provides a sub-
stitute for a real machine and functionalities needed to execute entire op-
erating systems.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) A network that extends a private network
across a public network, and enables users to send and receive data across
shared or public networks as if their computing devices were directly con-
nected to the private network.
virtualization The application of the layering principle through enforced mod-
ularity, whereby the exposed virtual resource is identical to the underlying
physical resource being virtualized [47].
VM consolidation A process of packing a set of running VMs on the same
physical machine to share resources and improve resource utilization.
VM live migration A process of moving a running VM between different phys-
ical machines without disconnecting or interrupting the clients and appli-
cations.
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